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The Supreme Court of Illinois, shown in the Weymouth Kirkland Courtroom, after hearing argument of two cases on its regular calendar
For the past five years Illinois trial and appellate courts
have held regular sessions, in the Weymouth Kirkland
Courtroom at the Law School. This year these court pro­
ceedings were closely integrated with the first-year pro­
gram of legal research and writing.' The favorable re­
sponse to this and other developments in the research and
writing program has prompted this report.
The inclusion of court proceedings in the curriculum
of a law school is a significant innovation in modern
legal education. In England law students were once
urged to give "diligent and constant attendance upon the
courts of justice...."2 Today a popular English text for
law students omits any mention of the value of court
attendance for the prospective lawyer," In America stu-
"
... Diligent and Constant Attendance ... "
The Courts and the Law School Tutorial Program
By DALLIN H. OAKS
Associate Professor of Law, The University of Chicago
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dents once learned law as understudies in the office and
courtroom. Today legal education has been ruled for
over fifty years by Langdell's case method, which "was
intended to exclude the traditional methods of learning
law by work in a lawyer's office, or attendance upon the
proceedings of courts of justicc.?" This antipathy toward
court attendance is still influential even where the case
method is weakening," So it is that the modern American
law student, bidden to immerse himself in the law, is like
the child in the nursery rhyme: privileged to go out to
swim but warned away from the water.
Jerome Frank advocated the use of court proceedings
to educate young lawyers in his 1932 report to the Alum­
ni Advisory Board of The University of Chicago Law
School." The initial steps were taken years later, under
the leadership of a Dean who was just beginning his
studies at the Law School the year Frank's report was
submitted. It was typical of Dean (as' he then was) Ed­
ward H. Levi that he made a spectacular improvement
upon the earlier suggestion. Frank wanted to take the
students and teachers to the courts. With the generous
assistance of the supporters of the Courtroom and the
remarkable cooperation of the Judiciary and the Bar,
Levi brought the courts to the School,"
The educational value of the court proceedings at the
Law School is not limited to those students who will prac­
tice in the trial and appellate courts. The highest value of
the proceedings is probably as an introduction to the
judicial process. First-hand observation of the work of
trial and appellate courts should give a student a sense
of reality about the legal process that will enrich his
study of the case materials that are still the staples of
legal education. Since the court sessions are of important
introductory value, it is the first-year students who are
most strongly urged to attend them.
For teaching purposes the court sessions have been
integrated with the first-year legal research and writing
program. The purpose of this program, which was
begun at the Law School in 1937, was to introduce the
beginning student to skills and techniques necessary for
the study and practice of law. Since 1948, when Professor
Harry Kalven's article reported on the Law School's
decade of experimentation with this tutorial work for
entering students, many other law schools have adopted
similar programs of individual training in research and
exposition."
The Chicago program is conducted by the Harry A.
Bigelow Teaching Fellows," under the supervision of a
permanent member of the faculty.l" The principal em­
phasis is on individual work by the student and on indi­
vidualized supervision, assistance and evaluation by the
Bigelow Fellows. In each successive assignment the stu­
dents and their instructors work toward a common objec­
tive, but in most cases the teaching Fellows have wide
latitude in the choice of problems to serve those objec-
Professor Oaks, right, confers with the Bigelow Teaching Fellows,
left to right: C. Michael Flesch, LL.B., University of London;
Michael Lester, B.A. (Oxon.), Senior Teaching Fellow; Richard
S. Ewing, LL.B., New York University Law School, and William
J. Church, LL.B. (Cantab.).
tives. The Fellows also have discretion in the means used
to assist their students and to evaluate and improve their
work, but the emphasis has always been on individual
attention to the student's own particular problems; The
current program has not changed that emphasis, but it
has incorporated new ways of introducing students to
legal research and new assignments designed to increase
what the students would learn from the court sessions.
The entering student's first assignment, which he re­
ceived the first or second day of school in the Autumn
Quarter, was designed to introduce him to the exposition
of legal materials. It consisted of two statutes and seven
court opinions from a single jurisdiction, together with
a related problem. After studying these materials the
student was required to prepare a memorandum on their
meaning and effect with reference to the problem posed.
The class sessions in the course on Elements of the Law,
which began with an intensive consideration of how to
read a case, were the student's principal help during this
abrupt and sometimes painful introduction to legal mate­
rials.
Three weeks after school began the student had com­
pleted his first assignment, had at least one lengthy inter­
view with his tutor and was ready for his introduction to
legal research. Although it is undoubtedly true that a
student will best learn how to use a library by using it,
his initial efforts can be furthered by some formal in­
struction. A lecture on the library is probably too vague
and tedious to be of much value. Instruction in the mate­
rials and techniques of legal research will be more effec­
tive if it is illustrated and if it is given within the frame­
work of law the students have learned in their initial
weeks of study.
This year the research phase was introduced by show­
ing students approximately fifty colored slides taken in
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the law library. Together with the accompanying ex­
planation, these slides illustrated the basic tools and tech­
niques of legal research (e.g., annotated statutes and re­
ports, digests, indices to legal periodicals, encyclopedias,
etc.) that a lawyer would use to locate and evaluate the
cases and statutes the students had discussed in their first
assignrnent.P This hour-long visual presentation was sup­
plemented by a written "Guide to Basic Research Tools
and to the Library." Following this basic introduction to
legal research the students were given small problems
on which they did the research and prepared written
memoranda.
After employing the basic research tools in this man­
ner, the first-year class met for a review session in which
they saw two films on legal research prepared by pub­
lishers of legal materials.l'' The showing of these films,
which are thought to be most effective when viewed by
students who have already made some use of the mate­
rials portrayed, concluded the formal instruction on legal
research.
The third assignment of the Autumn Quarter was de­
signed to prepare the students to realize the maximum
benefit from their attendance at the first court session, a
jury trial. It also gave additional practice in legal re­
search. First, the students completed a reading assign­
ment on the technique of preparation for trial, with
special emphasis on the preparation and function of the
trial brief." The written assignment consisted of a partial
outline of the "law" section of a trial brief, including
some thirty or forty legal questions that might arise con­
cerning voir dire questions, admissibility of evidence,
jury instructions, etc. It required the student to complete
research and submit a memorandum on one or more
points in each of these areas. This gave each student
Continuing the discussion over coffee in the Green Law Lounge
are, left to right, Senior Fellow Lester, Duane Krohnke, A.B.,
Grinnell College; Robert Shuker, A.B., Brown University; Profes­
sor Harry Kalven, Jr.; Richard Singer, A.B., Amherst College;
and Teaching Fellow Richard Ewing.
At a small group conference typical of the operation of the Tutor­
ial Program, Teaching Fellow William Church, center-right, works
with, left to right: William Pomerantz, B.A., Lawrence College;
George Badenoch, B.A., Dartmouth College; William Haley, B.A.,
University of Notre Dame; and Mary Lee Cullen, B.A., Loyola
University (Chicago).
some familiarity with several typical legal issues prior to
the trial. So that they would also be familiar with the
pleadings and disputed issues of fact, each student re­
ceived a copy of the complaint and answer and was asked
to pinpoint the factual issues to be resolved at the trial.
On November 19 and 20, 1963, the first-year class
attended the jury trial in the Weymouth Kirkland
Courtroom. The Honorable Jacob M. Braude (JD'20)
of the Circuit Court of Cook County presided. The case,
an action for personal injuries, had been selected by
Judge Braude from his regular calendar with the agree­
ment of clients and counsel.l" It proved ideal for instruc­
tional purposes.
The trial lasted two days, from selection of the jury
through setting of instructions (an in chambers proceed­
ing viewed by the students), closing arguments and ren­
dition of the verdict (for defendant). Students saw the
examination and cross-examination of witnesses, intro­
duction of documentary evidence, use of demonstrative
evidence, use and impeachment of expert testimony, sev­
eral arguments at the bench over the attempted introduc­
tion or exclusion of evidence, and the use of depositions
as evidence and for impeachment. After the jury had
been . discharged, Judge Braude conducted a brief ques­
tion-answer session for the students.
The students' interest and performance in this first
court assignment and their enthusiasm for the proceeding
itself was even more intense than expected. The whole
experience seemed to bear out Jerome Frank's observa­
tion that the difference between learning law in the
exciting context of live cases and that way of learning
to which students are now restricted in the schools "is like
the difference between kissing a girl and reading a trea­
tise on osculation.Y'" At any event, student tenacity in
holding counsel and questioning them informally long
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after the rest of the participants had left the courtroom
suggested that informal sessions with counsel following
the proceeding should be an indispensable part of a court
assignment.
The Winter Quarter began with a dual assignment.
First, the students were required to rewrite a short (2-3
page) excerpt from an obscure portion of a memoran­
dum submitted by one of their fellow students in the
second assignment. The objective of this exercise was to
impress the student again with the need for clarity and
brevity in legal exposition and to develop his willingness
and ability to achieve those objectives by rewriting. The
second portion of the assignment gave the student a
complicated set of facts and challenged him to identify
and do research on the relevant legal issues and submit
a memorandum.
The last of the research exercises in the program was
the "quickie" research exercise. This assignment tested
the student's ability to take oral directions, to do rapid
and effective research under time-pressure, and to give
clear oral and written reports of his research findings. In
short, it duplicated conditions and assignments encoun­
tered from time to time in most law offices. The exercise
began when a student reported to his tutor by appoint­
ment, and was given (orally) a small research assign­
ment. Two hours later the student returned to report and
discuss his findings. After a brief interview (10-15
minutes) with his tutor, the student had four more
hours to complete any additional research he deemed
necessary and to prepare and submit a short written
memorandum on the assigned subject." The time pres­
sure involved in this assignment had some unexpected
dividends. The Fellows reported that the memoranda of
some students whose writing had previously tended to
be excessively wordy became commendably terse. Some
students stated that the assignment taught them where
they had been wasting time in research. Most students
seemed to have zest for the exercise because it was thought
to involve techniques and time limitations similar to
those to be encountered in practice.
The remaining assignment in the Winter Quarter
introduced the students to the handling of facts and cases
in legal argument. This assignment was an ideal one to
coordinate with the session of the Illinois Appellate
Court at the Law School.
About three weeks before the court session the stu­
dents completed a reading assignment on methods and
techniques of legal argument. The selections included
discussions by Llewellyn, Medina and Wiener on stating
the question, presenting the facts, and employing or at­
tempting to distinguish cases in argument. Since advo­
cacy lends itself well to teaching by example, particularly
where the student is thoroughly familiar with the subject
being argued, these formal descriptions were supple­
mented with briefs prepared and filed in a real case that
involved issues identical to those the students had dis­
cussed in their first assignment. Because of their familiar­
ity with the subject matter in these sample briefs the
students could more critically appraise and benefit from
the attorneys' handling of the facts and law.
After completing these readings, the student was given
a problem drawn from one of the cases to be argued
before the Appellate Court. Each student received ap­
proximately 50 pages from the Abstract of Record, in­
cluding the complaint, jury verdict, judgment, post-trial
motions, and large portions of the testimony of witnesses
for both sides. This case was an action by a fourteen-year
old boy against a railroad for injuries received while he
was "flipping" (riding) a freight car near a children's
playground in the city of Chicago."? The student's as­
signment was to write statements of facts and questions
presented suitable for inclusion in the briefs of (a) plain­
tiff-appellee, and (b) defendant-appellant. In addition,
the student also received copies of the opinions in three
principal cases discussed in the briefs of counsel. For this
part of the assignment he was required to prepare two
case-briefs of each of the three cases, one brief drawn so
as to emphasize and the other drawn so as to minimize
the authoritative value of the case. After submitting his
case briefs and his version of the statements of facts and
questions presented each student received a copy of the
briefs filed in the case. Thus, he could study the argu­
ment (particularly the argument from the three selected
cases) and the statements of facts tendered by experi­
enced counsel. This prior study not only aroused interest
but also enhanced the benefit students could derive from
the oral argument.
The Appellate Court of Illinois heard arguments on
three cases in the Weymouth Kirkland Courtroom on
February 18, 1964. The Court for this session consisted
of Presiding Justice Joseph Burke, Justice Hugo Friend
(JD'08), and Justice James Bryant (JD'20). After argu-
The heart of the tutorial program is the personal conference.
Here tutor Michael Flesch discusses a paper with a first-year stu­
dent.
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ment in the case under study counsel met with the fi;st­
year students and subjected themselves to an hour of
questions relating to their conduct of the case. The stu­
dents' questions revealed a thorough knowledge of the
case (more than half of the class signified that they had
visited the scene of the accident before the argument)
and, according to counsel, a surprising degree of sophis­
tication about the techniques the lawyers had employed
at trial and on appeal. It should be added that counsel,
Cornelius P. Callahan, Jr., and Louis G. Davidson, were
extremely helpful and informative to the students.
This session with counsel, and the similar (though
more formal) session Judge Braude conducted at the
Law School after the jury trial in the Autumn Quarter,
reaffirmed what Edward Levi called "the Anglo-Ameri­
can tradition . . . that judges and lawyers are also
teachers.t'"
The legal research and writing program concluded
with two assignments in the Spring Quarter. One of
these assignments was a conventional moot court exer­
cise, which gave the student his first experience in writ­
ing a brief and arguing a case. Using a real record in a
reported case, the student prepared written briefs and
delivered an oral argument before a panel of judges con­
sisting of the Bigelow Fellows, other faculty members,
and students in the second and third-year moot court
program. Other students were of course assigned to brief
and argue the opposite side of the case. The selection of
suitable cases for first-year moot courts is not easy, but
the jury case tried at the Law School in the Autumn
Quarter was a natural choice. This year some of the
moot court participants were required to argue an appeal
of this case or variations of this case. Students so assigned
had the unusual opportunity of following a real case
from pleadings through verdict to appeal (albeit moot
appeal) and to study and work with the written record
in a case tried in their presence.
The culmination of the year's work in legal research
and writing was the assignment coordinated with a case
heard at the Law School by the Illinois Supreme Court
(Mr. Chief Justice Ray I. Klingbiel, Mr. Justice Joseph
E. Daily, Mr. Justice Harry B. Hershey (JD'l1) , Mr.
Justice Byron O. House, Mr. Justice Walter V. Schaefer
(JD'28), Mr. Justice Roy J. Solfisburg, and Mr. Justice
Robert c. Underwood).
Prior to the Supreme Court session the students re­
ceived and studied copies of the briefs filed in one of the
cases being argued, an appeal from a conviction for sell­
ing obscene books in violation of a Chicago ordinance."
The student's assignment was to put himself hypotheti­
cally in the position of the judge, to attend the oral
argument, and to write a judicial opinion disposing of
the case and resolving the questions raised. Thanks to
counsels' willingness to participate in another lengthy
session following the formal argument, the student-
The Honorable Jacob M. Braude, JD'20, Judge of the Circuit Court
of Cook County, takes his place an the bench as a session of the
jury trial held in the Kirkland Courtroom is about to begin.
judges even had an opportunity to question the lawyers
about their briefs, their arguments and their legal theo­
ries. In this session the students learned at first-hand
the value of oral argument to a judge who must prepare
an opinion. When completed, the student opinions, like
all of the other assignments in the program, were graded
by the tutors and discussed individually with the student
authors.
With the completion of this exercise, the first-year
student had participated in most of the important phases
of the trial and appellate process. In the course of his
first year he had instruction and practice in legal research
and writing, including preparation of memoranda and
briefs, and in oral argument. In addition, he had been a
A portion of the audience, largely student, which heard Louis G.
Davidson argue before the Illinois Appellate Court in the Kirkland
Courtroom.
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During a recess in the jury trial, students cross-examine Leo K. Wykell, of the Illinois Bar, counsel for the plaintiff
spectator, and to some extent a participant (through co­
ordinated assignments), in actual judicial proceedings, at
each of the principal trial and appellate levels in the
Illinois State Courts: a Circuit Court jury trial and ses­
sions of the Appellate Court and Supreme Court of Illi­
nOIS.
The integration of the Illinois court sessions into the
legal research and writing program is the most recent
example of the Law School's continuing effort to realize
for its students the opportunities envisioned by Chief
Justice Warren when he laid the cornerstone for the new
building on May 28, 1958:
The construction of any new law school building is a notable
event, but the construction of this particular building should be
one of great significance to the Bench and Bar of our Nation as
well as to the cause of legal education. It will be unique among
the law schools of the world. Standing between its great parent
University and the American Bar Center, and containing a court­
room that will be used for sessions of the Illinois Supreme Court,
this building will offer its occupants an unprecedented opportu­
nity to enrich the conventional legal curriculum with the spirit of
scholarly achievement, the practical outlook of the organized Bar,
and the day-to-day operations of one of our most distinguished
state courts.
It will not merely be a one-way street between the law school
and these other segments of our profession. Benefits will flow to
and from each of them. Each can pass on to the others its own
strengths, and receive support from them where strength is needed.
It will provide the best opportunity in America for an integrated
approach to the many problems that confront all of us in the
adminstration of Justice.
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1 The Legal Research and Writing Program comprises five of the 48
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Williams, Study and Practice of the Law, 126 (1823).
3 Williams, Learning the Law, 4 (7th ed. 1963).
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5 Out of approximately 600 students questioned at Harvard in 1937
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L. J. 1303, 1311 (1947).
6 "Law students should be given the opportunity to see legal opera­
tions. Their study of cases should be supplemented by frequent visits,
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Year Books, that judges and lawyers are also teachers." Levi, Four Talks
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10 The 1963-64 program has been under the supervision of Dallin
H. Oaks in consultation with a faculty committee of which Professor
Bernard D. Meltzer has been chairman.
11 This idea was borrowed from Geoffrey C. Hazard, J r., Professor
of Law, The University of California; Professor of Law, The University
of Chicago, effective July 1, 1964.
12 West Publishing Co., "Where Law and Practice Meet" (film);
Shepard's Citations, "How To Use Shepard's Citations" (filmstrip).
13 Bromley, "The Technique of Preparation for Trials," a speech
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14 Calvin Williams, a minor, by Mattie Williams v. Chicago Housing
Authority, Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 57C-12170. The attorney
for plaintiff was Leo K. Wykell; attorney for defendant was William
Butler.
15 Frank, supra note 5, at 1317.
16 Since the students were under considerable pressure during this
six-hour period, it was of course imperative that no two students were
working on a similar problem or even (so far as avoidable) with the
same books.
17 American National Bank and Trust Co., v. The Pennsylvania Rail­
road Co., Illinois Appellate Court, No. 49221. The attorney for appellants
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son.
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19 City of Chicago v. Charles Kimmel, Illinois Supreme Court, No.
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Four New Appointments
RONALD H. COASE, an economist who is a leading inter­
national authority on public policy and the governmental
regulation of industries, has been appointed Professor of
Economics in the Law School and the Graduate School
of Business, effective September 1, 1964. He is currently
Professor of Economics at the University of Virginia .
Coase also will become co-editor, with Aaron Director,
Professor of Economics in the Law School, of The Jour­
nal of Law and Economics, published by the Law
School.
The appointment was announced by Edward H. Levi,
Provost of the University, who said:
"In practice, law and business are rarely separated; but
in academic affairs, they too frequently are examined as
disparate concerns. Professor Coase brings together two
spheres of inquiry which belong together for both in­
structional and research purposes. He follows in the
tradition joining economics and law established at the
University by the late Henry Simons."
Coase joined the faculty of the University of Virginia
in 1958. From 1951 to 1958 he was a member of the fac­
ulty of the University of Buffalo. From 1935 to 1951 he
was a member of the faculty or the London School of
Economics.
During World War II, from 1941 to 1946, he served
as statistician and later Chief Statistician of the Central
Statistical Office, Offices of the War Cabinet. From 1945
to 1946 he was Acting British Director of Statistics and
Intelligence, Combined Production and Recourses Board,
and the Representative of the Central Statistical Office in
Washington.
Two of his more prominent articles are "The Federal
Communications Commission," Journal of Law and
Economics, October, 1959, and "The Problem of Social
Cost," Journal of Law and Economics) October, 1960.
He received the degree of Doctor of Science in Eco­
nomics from the London School of Economics.
NORVAL RAMSDEN MORRIS, internationally renowned
criminologist and authority on criminal law, has been
appointed Professor of Law, effective Autumn, 1%4.
His appointment was announced by Edward H. Levi,
Provost of The University of Chicago.
Morris since 1962 has been Director, Asia and Far East
Institute for the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of
Offenders, an agency of the United Nations. The Insti­
tute was established to train personnel and conduct
studies and research in the field of the prevention of
crime and the treatment of offenders as well as in the
prevention of juvenile delinquency and treatment of ju­
venile delinquents.
Prior to assuming the directorship of this Institute,
Morris was Dean of the Faculty of Law and Bonython
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Professor of Law at the University of Adelaide, Adelaide,
Australia.
Dean Neal has commented:
"Mr. Morris has what is probably an unmatched
knowledge of correctional practices and problems
throughout the world. He extends the range of research
and teaching interests of the Law School's distinguished
faculty to the social and legal questions of crime in many
cultures and countries other than the United States.
"Mr. Morris' interests complement those of Francis A.
Allen, recently appointed a University Professor on the
faculty of both the Law School and the University's School
of Social Service Administration.
"Allen has concentrated on domestic aspects of criminal
law while Morris has devoted himself to this field of
concern abroad. However, Morris' work at The Univer­
sity of Chicago will be directed to criminal law and
criminological research on American as well as foreign
problems.
"The combination of these two men provides the Uni­
versity with unparalleled strength in the field of criminal
law."
Morris was born in Aukland, New Zealand, October
1, 1923, but as a child, he moved with his family to
Australia.
He received an LL.B. (1946) and an LL.M. (1947)
from the University of Melbourne. He received a Ph.D.
in criminology from the University of London in 1949.
He has held positions at the University of Melbourne,
the University of London, Harvard Law School, New
York University, and the University of Utah.
He has written extensively in the field of criminal law.
One of his works, The Habitual Criminal (London,
1951), remains the outstanding discussion of British ef­
forts to respond to the problem of the recidivist.
Other Australian and international organizations deal­
ing with the problems of criminal law, on which he has
served include: Rapporteur, first section, Third Interna­
tional Congress on Criminology (1955). Australian mem­
ber of the International Editorial Board of "Excerpta
Criminologica," 1960. Member, Social Science Research
Council of Australia, 1960. Morris is married and the
father of three children.
GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., an authority on civil proce­
dure and judicial administration, has been appointed
Professor of Law, effective July 1. He now is a Professor
of Law at the University of California at Berkeley.
Hazard received his B.A. from Swarthmore College in
1953 and his LL.B. from Columbia University in 1954.
He served as Deputy Legislative Counsel for the State
of Oregon from 1956 to 1957. He served as Executive
Secretary of the Oregon Legislative Interim Committee
on Judicial Administration from 1957 to 1958. He joined
the faculty of the University of California in 1958.
He is the author of "Research in Civil Procedure"
(1963), one of a series of surveys on research in the field
of law commissioned by the Walter E. Meyer Research
Institute of Law. He is also the author of Pleading and
Procedure, State and Federal, (1962) with David W.
Louisell. Hazard has produced a film used by law stu­
dents, entitled "Instruction in Trial Technique."
Hazard and his wife are the parents of two sons and
a daughter. He was born in Cleveland in 1929.
GRANT GILMORE, currently William K. Townsend Pro­
fessor of Law at the Yale Law School, has accepted a
permanent appointment to the Law School Faculty be­
ginning in 1965. The early years of Mr. Gilmore's career
were somewhat unusual for a law teacher. He received
his B.A. from Yale, in 1931, and his PhD. in Romance
Languages, also from Yale, in 1936; he then taught
French at Yale College until 1940, when he decided to
enter law school. He was graduated from Yale Law
School in 1942, with the LL.B. degree.
He practiced from 1942 to 1944 with Milbank, Tweed,
Hope and Hadley, in New York City, and then was in
military service until 1946. In that year Mr. Gilmore
joined the faculty of the Yale Law School, where he has
remained until the present time. He has served as Visit­
ing Professor at the University of California at Berkeley,
Columbia, Harvard, and the University of Chicago Law
School.
Mr. Gilmore is the author of numerous articles, and
co-author, with Charles L. Black, Jr., of a treatise, The
Law of Admiralty, which has become the standard work
in the field. He was Associate Reporter for Article 9 of
the Uniform Commercial Code, and is currently working
on a book dealing with secured transactions and personal
property under that article. His principal fields are con­
tracts, admiralty, commercial transactions, and negotiable
instruments.
Mrs. Gilmore is a practicing psychiatrist. They have a
son and a daughter.
Trial Moot Court
The Hinton Moot Court Committee, chaired during the
current academic year by Robert V. Johnson, of Chicago,
A.B., Kalamazoo College, conducts the Hinton Compe­
tition, an appellate moot court competition operated as
an extra-curricular activity for second and third year stu­
dents. (All students brief and argue one moot court case
as part of the first year Tutorial Program.)
This year, an. experimental moot court trial was added
to the program. A jury, composed of undergraduate stu­
dents, was selected at a voir dire presided over by Louis
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G. Davidson, of the Chicago Bar. The case was tried on
February 6, 1964, in the Weymouth Kirkland Court­
room, with the Honorable Richard B. Austin, JD'26,
Judge of the United States District Court for the North­
ern District of Illinois, presiding.
The case, People of the State of Illinois v. Ronald
Kolins, in which defendant was accused of manslaughter,
involved the use of expert medical testimony, which was
presented by students in The University of Chicago School
of Medicine.
Samalya Dodek, of Washington, D.C., A.B., Wellesley
College, and Michael A. Feit, of Paterson, N.J., A.B.,
Syracuse University, appeared for the People, with Al­
bert Hofeld, of Evanston, 111., A.B., Harvard University,
and Nicholas Monsour, of Pittsburgh, A.B., Bowdoin
College, for the defendant. Arrangements for the trial
were under the direction of James Krasnoo, of Brighton,
Mass., A.B., Harvard University.
During the Trial Moot Court, Nicholas Monsour, A.B., Bowdoin
College, addresses the jury, composed of undergraduate students
in the University.
Counsel confer with the Court, before the Moot Trial begins. Left
to right: Michael A. Feit, A.B., Syracuse University; Samayla S.
Dodek, A.B., Wellesley College; the Honorable Richard B. Austin,
JD'26, Judge of the U.S. District Court; Nicholas Monsour, A.B.,
Bowdoin College; Albert Hofeld, A.B., Harvard University, and
James Krasnoo, A.B., Harvard University.
The Court of the Union
or
Julius Caesar Revised
By PHILIP B. KURLAND
Professor of Law, TIle University of Chicago Law School
The paper which follows was delivered at a conference, held at the
Law School of the University o] Notre Dame on February 29. It
will appear in a forthcoming issue o] the Notre Dame Lawyer,
and appears here with the permission of the Editors of that journal
and o] the author.
Dean O'Meara's subpoena was greeted by honest pro­
tests from me that I had nothing to contribute to the
"Great Debate" over the proposed constitutional amend­
ments that are the subject of today's conference. The
Dean, apparently of the belief that suffering might help
this audience toward moral regeneration, suggested that
I come anyway. I proceed then to prove my proposition
and to test his hypothesis.
I have chosen as a title for this small effort: "Julius
Caesar Revised." "Revised" because, unlike Mark An­
tony, I have been invited here not to bury Caesar but to
praise him. Our Caesar, the Supreme Court, unlike
Shakespeare's Julius, does not call for a funeral oration,
because the warnings of lions in the streets-instead of
under the throne-were timely heeded as well as
sounded. Caesar was thus able to rally his friends to fend
off the death strokes that the conspirators would have
inflicted. The conspiratorial leaders were the members of
the Council of State Governments. The daggers they pro­
posed to use were the chief justices of the various high
state courts, to whom they would entrust, under the re­
sounding label of "The Court of the Union," the power
to review judgments of the Supreme Court of the United
States whenever that tribunal dared to inhibit the power
of the states. It should be made clear that the chief jus­
tices of the states would be the instruments of the crime
and not its perpetrators. You will recall that when these
chief justices spoke through their collective voice, the
Conference of Chief Justices, in condemnation of some
of the transgressions of the Supreme Court, they asked
only that the physician heal himself. They did not pro­
pose any organic changes, however little they liked the
Court's work. Their report stated:"
... when we turn to the specific field of the effect of judicial
decisions on federal-state relationships we corne at once to the
question as to where power should lie to give the ultimate inter­
pretation to the Constitution and to the laws made in pursuance
thereof under .the authority of the United States. By necessity
and by almost universal common consent, these ultimate powers
are regarded as being vested in the Supreme Court of the United
States. Any other allocation of such power would seem to lead
to chaos.
Even in the absence of Caesar's murder, however, it is
possible to pose the issue raised by Brutus: whether our
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Caesar has been unduly ambitious and grasping of
power? And implicit in this question is a second: if
Caesar's ambitions do constitute a threat to the republic,
is assassination the appropriate method for dealing with
that threat?
The second question is easier of answer than the first.
Whether Caesar be guilty or not, it would seem patently
clear that his murder, as proposed, must be resisted. Its
consequences could only be costly and destructive civil
conflict resulting in the creation of a new Caesar in the
place of the old one, a new Caesar not nearly so well­
equipped to perform the task nor even so benevolent as
Julius himself.
It is probably because of the obvious absurdity of the
method chosen for limiting the Supreme Court's powers
that there is today even more unanimity in opposition to
the proposal than existed when Caesar was last attacked
-not by the current self-styled patricians, but by the
plebeians under the leadership of Franklin Delano Roose­
velt. For then it was only the conservatives that came to
the defense of the Court; the liberals were prepared to
destroy it. Today, as Professor Charles Black has made
clear, even if in rather patronizing tones, the conserva­
tives are solidly lined up in defense of an institution
many of whose decisions are repugnant to them," The
conservatives would seem to be concerned with the
preservation of the institution; the liberals with the
preservation of the benefits that the current Court has
awarded them. For the latter the contents of Caesar's
will appears to make the difference.
It would seem, therefore, that only those close to the
lunatic fringe, the Birchers and the White Citizens Coun­
cils and others of their ilk, are prepared to support the
purported court-of-the-union plan. Even in the Council
of State Governments the proposed amendment was sup­
ported by a majority of only one vote. The few legisla­
tures that have voted in support of this amendment are
those normally concerned with their war on Robin Hood
and similarly dangerous radicals. I do not mean to sug­
gest that the Court is not in danger of being restrained.
But I do think that the proposed method of destruction
is not a very real threat unless this country is already
closer to Gibbon's Rome than to Caesar's.
On the other hand, to say that the plan for a Court of
the Union is an absurdity is not to answer the question
whether Caesar suffers from an excess of ambitions. The
Great Debate called for by the Chief Justice at the Amer­
ican Law Institute meeting last May has not really con­
cerned itself with this problem. The Great Debate has
taken the form of rhetorical forays. Each side argues that
the proposed limitation on the powers of the Court
would result in the removal of national power and the
enhancement of the power of the states. The forces of
Cassius and Brutus argue that this is a desirable result
because the dispersal of government power is the only
means of assuring that individual liberty will not be
trodden under the tyrannous boots of socialist egalitarian­
ism. Antony contends that the adoption of the proposal
would be to return us to a fragmented confederation
impotent to carryon the duties of government in the
world of the twentieth century. Roosevelt's words about
a "horse and buggy era" are this time used in defense
of the Court. With all due respect, I submit that the
essential question remains unanswered. The Talmud
tells us that ambition destroys its possessor. Does the
Court's behavior invite its own destruction?
In what ways is it charged that this Caesar seeks for
power that does not belong to him? Some such asser­
tions can be rejected as the charges of disappointed suit­
ors. But there are others that cannot be so readily dis­
missed on the ground of the malice of claimant. Allow
me to itemize a few of the latter together with some
supporting testimony:
Item: The Court has unreasonably infringed on the
authority committed by the Constitution to other branch­
es of the Government.
Listen to one of the recent witnesses:
The claim for judicial relief in this case strikes at one of the
fundamental doctrines of our system of government, the separa­
tion of powers. In upholding the claim, the Court attempts to
effect reforms in a field which the Constitution, as plainly as can
be, has committed exclusively to the political process.
This Court, no less than all other branches of the Government,
is bound by the Constitution. The Constitution does not confer
on the Court blanket authority to step into every situation where
the political branch may have fallen short. The stability of this
institution ultimately depends not only upon its being alert to
keep the other branches of government within constitutional
bounds but equally upon recognition of the limitations on the
Court's own functions in the constitutional system.
This is not the charge of a Georgia legislator. These are
the words of Mrs. Justice Harlan, spoken as recently as
last February 17, in Wesberry v. Sanders.'
Item: The Supreme Court has severely and unneces­
sarily limited the power of the states to enforce their
criminal laws.
Thus one recent critic had this to say:
The rights of the States to develop and enforce their own judi­
cial procedures, consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment, have
long been recognized as essential to the concept of a· healthy
federalism. Those rights are today attenuated if not obliterated
in the name of a victory for the "struggle for personal liberty."
But the Constitution comprehends another struggle of equal
importance and places on [the Supreme Court] the burden of
maintaining it-the struggle for law and order. I regret that the
Court does not often recognize that each defeat in that struggle
chips away inexorably at the base of that very personal liberty
which it seeks to protect. One is reminded of the exclamation of
Pyrrhus: "One more such victory ... , and we are utterly un­
done."
This, I should tell you, is not the Conference of Chief
Justices complaining about the abuses of federal habeas
corpus practices; it is Mr. Justice Clark expressing his
dissatisfaction in Fay v. Noia.'
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Item: The Court has revived the evils of "substantive
due process," the cardinal sin committed by the Hughes
Court, and the one that almost brought about its destruc­
tion.
Here another expert witness has said:
Finally, I deem this application of "cruel and unusual punish­
ment" so novel that I suspect the Court was hard put to' find a
way to ascribe to the Framers of the Constitution the result
reached today rather than to its own notions of ordered liberty.
If this case involved economic regulation, the present Court's
allergy to substantive due process would surely save the statute
and prevent the Court from imposing its own philosophical pre­
dilections upon state legislatures or Congress. I fail to see why
the Court deems it more appropriate to write into the Constitu­
tion its own abstract notions of how best to handle the narcotics
problem, for it obviously cannot match either the States or Con­
gress in expert understanding.
This is the hand as. well as the voice of Mr. Justice White
in Robinson v. Caiiiornia.:
Item: The Court has usurped the powers of the na­
tional legislature in rewriting statutes to express its own
policy rather than executing the decisions made by the
branch of government charged with that responsibility.
Listen to two deponents whose right to speak to such
an issue is not ordinarily challenged.
What the Court appears to have done is to create not simply
a duty of inspection, but an absolute duty to discovery of all
defects; in short, it has made the B & 0 the insurer of the con­
ditions of all premises and equipment, whether its own or others,
upon which its employees may work. This is wholly salutary
principle of compensation for industrial injury incorporated by
workmen's compensation statutes, but it is not the one created
by the F.E.L.A., which premises liability upon negligence of the
employing railroad. It is my view that, as a matter of policy,
employees such as the petitioner, who are injured in the course
of their employment, should be entitled to prompt and adequate
compensation regardless of the employer'S negligence and free
from traditional common-law rules limiting recovery. But Con­
gress has elected a different test of liability which, until changed,
courts are obliged to apply.
No, those are not the words of Mr. Justice Frankfurter,
but those of his successor, Mr. Justice Goldberg, in
Shenker v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co.6
Listen to the same criticism in even more strident
tones:
The present case ... will, I think, be marked as the baldest
attempt by judges in modern times to spin their own philosophy
into the fabric of the law, in derogation of the will of the
legislature.
Here we have Mr. Justice Douglas in dissent from the
opinion of Mr. Justice Black in Arizona v. Calijornia"
Item: The Court writes or rewrites law for the purpose
of conferring benefits on Negroes that it would not af­
ford to others.
I offer here some testimony endorsed by Justices Har­
lan, Clark, and Stewart, in N.A.A.C.P. v. Button:8
No member of this Court would disagree that the validity of
state action claimed to infringe rights assured by the Fourteenth
Amendment is to be judged by the same basic constitutional
standard whether or not racial problems are involved. No worse
setback could befall the great principles established by Brown v.
Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, than to give fair-minded per­
sons reasons to think otherwise. With all respect, I believe that the
striking down of this Virginia statute cannot be squared with
accepted constitutional doctrine in the domain of state regulatory
power over the legal profession.
Item: The Court disregards precedents at will without
offering adequate reasons for change.
Mr. Justice Brennan puts his charge in short compass
in Pan American Airways v. United States "
The root error, as I see it, in the Court's decision is that it
works an extraordinary and unwarranted departure from the
settled principles by which the antitrust and regulatory regimes
of law are accommodated to each other.
Item: The Court uses its judgments not only to re­
solve the case before it but to prepare advisory opinions
or worse, advisory opinions that do not advise.
The testimony here includes the following:
The Court has done little more today than to supply new
phrases-imprecise in scope and uncertain in meaning-for the
habeas corpus vocabulary for District Court judges. And because
they purport to establish mandatory requirements rather than
guidelines, the tests elaborated in the Court's opinion run the
serious risk of becoming talismanic phrases, the mechanistic in­
vocation of which will alone determine whether or not a hearing
is to be had.
More fundamentally, the enunciation of an elaborate set of
standards governing habeas corpus hearings is in no sense re­
quired, or even invited, in order to decide the case ... and the
many pages of the Court's opinion which set these standards
forth cannot, therefore, be justified even in terms of the normal
function of dictum. The reasons for the rule against advisory
opinions which purport to decide questions not actually in issue
are too well established to need repeating at this late date....
This is not the plea by academic followers of Herbert
Wechsler for principled decisions nor even an argument
by Wechsler's opponents for ad hoc resolutions. It is the
view of Mr. Justice Stewart in Townsend v. Saini"
Item: Not unrelated to the charge just specified is the
proposition that the Court seeks out constitutional prob­
lems when it could very well rest judgment on less lofty
grounds.
Here is the Chief Justice himself speaking in Commu­
nist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Boardi'?
... I do not believe that strongly felt convictions on constitu­
tional questions or a desire to shorten the course of this litigation
justifies the Court in resolving any of the constitutional questions
presented so long as the record makes manifest, as I think it
does, the existence of non-constitutional questions upon which
this phase of the proceedings should be adjudicated.... I do not
think that the Court's action can be justified.
Item: The Court has unduly circumscribed the Con­
gressional power of investigation.
The testimony I offer here is not that of the chairman
of the House Un-American Affairs Committee nor that
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of the Birch Society. It derives from Mr. Justice White's
opinion in Gibson v. Florida Investigation CommitteeiP
The net effect of the Court's decision is, of course, to insulate
from effective legislation the time-proven skills of the Communist
Party in subverting and eventually controlling legitimate organi­
zations. Until such a group, chosen as an object of Communist
Party action, has been effectively reduced to vassalage, legislative
bodies may seek no information from the organization under
attack by duty-bound Communists. When the job has been done
and the legislative committee can prove it, it then has the hollow
privilege of recording another victory for the Communist Party,
which both Congress and this Court have found to be an organi­
zation under the direction of a foreign power, dedicated to the
overthrow of the Government if necessary by force and violence.
Item: I will close the list with the repeated charge that
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
as applied by the Court consists only of the "evanescent
standards" of each judge's notions of "natural law." The
charge is most strongly supported by the opinions of Mr.
Justice Black in Adamson v. Calijornia'? and Rochin v.
Caliiornia." to which I commend you.
I close the catalogue not because it is exhausted. These
constitute but a small part of Brutus's indictment and
an even smaller proportion of the witnesses prepared to
testify to the Court's grasp for power. These witnesses
are impressive, however, for they are not enemies of the
Court but part of it. Moreover, their depositions may be
garnered simply by thumbing the pages of the recent
volumes of the United States Reports, which is exactly
the way that my partial catalogue was created.
Let me make clear that this testimony does not prove
Caesar's guilt, but only demonstrates that these charges
cannot be dismissed out of hand. The fact that they are
endorsed by such irresponsible groups as would support
the proposed constitutional amendment does not add to
their validity. But neither does such support invalidate
them.
What then of Antony's defenses of Caesar?
First is the proposition that our Caesar has done no
more than perform the duties with which he is charged.
We have it from no less. eminent an authority than Paul
Freund that the Court has not exceeded its functions and
he defines them thus :15
First of all, the Court has a responsibility to maintain the
constitutional order, the distribution of public power and the
limitation on that power. ...
A second great mission of the Court is to maintain a common
market of continental extent against state barriers or state trade
preferences. . . .
In the third place, there falls to the Court a vital role in the
preservation of an open society, whose government is to remain
both responsive and responsible.... Responsive government re­
quires freedom of expression; responsible government demands
fairness of representation.
And so, Professor Freund suggests, the Court has done
no more than its,duty and he predicts that we shall be
grateful to it :16
The future is not likely to bring a lessening of governmental
intervention in our personal concerns. And as science advances
into outer and inner space-the far reaches of the galaxy and
the deep recesses of the mind-as physical controls become pos­
sible over our genetic and our psychic constitutions, we may
have reason to be thankful that some limits are set by our legal
constitution. We may have reason to be grateful that we are
being equipped with legal controls, with decent procedures, with
access to the centers of decision-making, and participation in our
secular destiny, for our days and for the days we shall not see.
It is not clear to me that the second defense is really
different from the first. Here we are met with the prop­
osition that the Court, politically the least responsible
branch of government, has proved itself to be morally
the most responsible. In short, the Court has acted be­
cause the other branches of government state and na­
tional have failed to act. And a parade of horribles would
not be imaginary that marched before us the abuses that
the community has rained on the Negro; the evils of
McCarthyism and the continued restrictions on freedom
of thought committed by the national legislature; the
refusal of the states and the nation to make it possible
for the voices of the disenfranchised to be heard, either
by preventing groups from voting, or by mechanisms for
continued control of the legislature by the politically en­
trenched, including gerrymandering, and subordination
of majority rule by the filibuster and committee control
of Congress; the police tactics that violate the most treas­
ured rights of the human personality, police tactics that
we have all condemned when exercised by the Nazis and
the Communists. This list, too, may be extended almost
to infinity. There can be little doubt that the other
branches of government have failed in meeting some
of their essential obligations to provide constitutional
government.
The third defense is that which I have labelled the
defense of Caeser's will. It is put most frankly and terse­
ly by Professor John Roche in this way P
As a participant in American society in 1963-somewhat re­
moved from the abstract world of democratic political theory­
I am delighted when the Supreme Court takes action against
"bad" policy on whatever constitutional basis it can establish or
invent. In short, I accept Aristotle's dictum that the essence of
political tragedy is for the good to be opposed in the name of
the perfect. Thus, while I wish with Professors Wechsler and
Kurland, inter alios, that Supreme Court Justices could proceed
on the same principles as British judges, it does not unsettle or
irritate me when they behave like Americans. Had I been a
member of the Court in 1954, I would unhesitatingly have sup­
ported the constitutional death-sentence on racial segregation,
even though it seems to me that in a properly ordered democratic
society this should be a task for the legislature. To paraphrase
St. Augustine, in this world one must take his breaks where he
finds them.
There then are the pleadings. I do not pretend to a
capacity to decide the case. It certainly isn't ripe for
summary judgment or judgment on the pleadings. I am
,fearful only that if the case goes to issue in this manner,
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the result will be chaos whichever side prevails. For, like
Judge Learned Hand, I am apprehensive that if nothing
protects our democracy and freedom except the bulwarks
that the Court can erect, we are doomed to failure. Thus,
I would answer the question that purports to be mooted
today, whether the court-of-the-union amendment should
be promulgated, in the words of that great judge :18
And SO', to sum up, I believe that for by far the greater part
of their work it is a condition upon the success of our system
that the judges should be independent; and I do not believe that
their independence should be impaired because of their constitu­
tional function. But the price of this immunity, I insist, is that
they should not have the last word in those basic conflicts of
"right and wrong-between whose endless jar justice resides."
You may ask then what will become of the fundamental prin­
ciples of equity and fair play which our constitutions enshrine;
and whether I seriously believe that unsupported they will serve
merely as counsels of moderation. I do not think that anyone
can say what will be left of those principles; I do not know
whether they will serve only as counsels; but this much I think
I do know-that a society so riven that the spirit of moderation
is gone, no court can save; that a society where that spirit flour­
ishes, no court need save; that in a society which evades its
responsibility by thrusting upon the courts the nurture of that
spirit, that spirit in the end will perish.
I find then that I have come neither to praise nor to
bury Caesar. I should only remind those who would de­
story Caesar of the self-destruction to which the noble
Brutus was brought; nor can the Antonys among us­
who would use Caesar for their own ends-rejoice at
his ultimate fate. For Caesar himself, I should borrow
the advice given Cromwell by Wolsey: "I charge thee,
fling away ambition: By that sin fell the angels."
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Welcome from the University
By GLEN A. LLOYD, JD'23
The following remarks were delivered by Mr. Uoyd at the Dedi­
cation of the William Clarke Mason Wing and the William Nelson
Cromwell Library, both new additions to the American Bar Cen­
ter. The Center, national headquarters of the profession, is located
on the University of Chicago campus, immediately adjacent to the
Law Buildings. Mr. Uoyd is a member, and former Chairman, of
the Board of Trustees of the University, and a past president of
the Law Alumni Association. The talk below is reprinted from the
American Bar Association Journal, Volume 49, Number 10, (Octo­
ber, 1963), with the permission of the Editors of the Journal
and of the author.
Nine years ago the University of Chicago was highly
honored by the establishment of the American Bar Cen­
ter on the Midway. Today it is again honored by this
dedication and what lies behind it-and that is the re­
markable development of the center during nine short
years. From the university's point of view, the relation­
ship has been fruitful and promising.
This university had a purposeful and dramatic origin
a little over seventy years ago. Its progress has been much
like its origin. It has been blessed with good fortune
from the beginning. Your arrival as a distinguished
neighbor was one of these blessings. I am now convinced
that we shall soon share another. It will be the successful
completion of the "Famous Professional Mile" from
Cottage Grove to Stony Island between 60th and 61st
Streets, under what is commonly called the South Cam­
pus Plan.
We welcome you not only as a good neighbor, which
you are, but more importantly because certain extraor­
dinary opportunities lie before us working together,
which do not lie before either of us working alone.
It would like to mention two areas of human concern
in which this cooperation may prove especially useful.
Conditions under which we all must live are changing
so rapidly that only new thinking and perhaps new ties
between dependable institutions can provide the knowl­
edge, the strength and the wise decisions which will as­
sure the success of our national and international pro­
grams.
The American Bar Association and its related institu­
tions have not only an unusual but perhaps the only di­
rect, systematic and continuous line of communication
with a vast number of the people who are daily making
many, if not most, of these decisions. I refer specifically
to men and women with legal training who are in the
active practice of the law, to judges at all levels in the
judicial system, to legislators, both state and federal, and
to those thousands who are in policy-making positions
with corporations and other private institutions.
It is suggested that the mutual enrichment from our
new relationship may, as time goes on, provide the essen­
tial ingredients-practical and intellectual-for creating
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the ideas and the motivation which, if made a part of
this decision-making process, will move us toward a more
just society.
Then too, it is no cliche to say that the whole world
lives in the shadow of a possible war which would be
utterly destructive. Everyone asks: Is there a way to avoid
it? This, of course, no one knows.
But there is one possible alternative-perhaps only one,
and that is through an enlightened and intensified use of
a revitalized rule of law for world peace. This will re­
quire an upgrading of the conventional concept of justice
through law by combining it with the best intellectual
attributes, especially in the fields of the social sciences
and the humanities.
The American Bar Association has already made this
approach more than mere oratory or a thin hope by
starting this revitalization. It has done so through spon­
sorship this summer of the first World Conference on
World Peace through Law, at Athens, Greece. Legally
trained representatives from over 100 countries, under
the skillful guidance of a former President of the Asso­
ciation, approved a Declaration of General Principles, a
Lawyer's Global Work Program, the establishment of
the World Peace through Law Center, a "World Law
Day" and a "World Law Year."
Thus the Association, through its Special Committee
on World Peace through Law, has set in motion a
movement among the legally trained people of the
world which, if developed in an atmosphere of objectiv­
ity, determination and intelligence may ultimately pro­
vide a workable alternative to nuclear war. In any event,
if it does not, I ask you: What will? It may be an un­
conventional and strong statement to say that this hope
lies beyond any combination of forces, political or other­
wise, which does not rest solidly upon a foundation cre­
ated by an intimate relationship between the best attri­
butes of the rule of law and those of our great centers
of learning-a new relationship of the kind well under
way here in Chicago.
The University of Chicago in a dark hour in 1941
reluctantly welcomed the almost impossible task of
quickly unlocking the final secrets of nuclear fission. It
would seem highly appropriate for it now to welcome
the opportunity of being one of a team devoted to im­
proving the quality of justice in our own nation and
developing a system for peaceful settlement of differences
between nations. This it does enthusiastically.
The University of Chicago, therefore, for these reasons
and in support of these opportunities welcomes you· not
just for this afternoon-but forever.
The Board of Editors of the University of Chicago Law Review, for 1963-64. Standing, left to right: Michael H. Shapiro, A.B., A.M.,
University of California, Los Angeles; Gerald M. Penner, A.B., University of Michigan; Richard L. Chesney, A.B., University of Cali­
fornia, Berkeley; William H. Goodman, A.B., University of Chicago; George B. Javaras, S.B., Northwestern University; Bruce L. Engel,
A.B., Reed College; Robert J. Vollen, A.B., University of Michigan; and Charles A. Heckman, A.B., Brown University. Seated, left to
right: Michael G. Wolfson, A.B., University of Chicago; Harold L. Henderson, A.B., University of Chicago; Lillian K. Vincent, A.B.,
Swarthmore College; William A. Wineberg, Jr., A.B., Stanford University, Editor-in-Chief; and Edmund W. Kitch, A.B., Yale University.
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The Eighth Freund Lecture
The Right Honorable Sir Kenneth Diplock, Lord Justice
of the Court of Appeal, delivered the Eighth Ernst
Freund Lecture. The Lecture was established in honor
of one of the most distinguished members of the Law
Faculty, who served as Professor of Law from the found­
ing of the School in 1903 until his death in 1933. Plans
are now under way for an appropriate observance of the
centennial of Ernst Freund's birth. A description of those
plans and an appreciation of Professor Freund's contri­
bution to American law and legal education will appear
in the next issue of the Record.
William John Kenneth Diplock went to the Middle
Temple from University College, Oxford, and became a
Barrister in 1932. He was Secretary to the Master of the
Rolls from 1939 until 1948, except for service in the RAF
during 1941-45. He took silk in 1948, was Recorder of
Oxford University from 1951 until 1956, and, in the latter
year served as Master of the Bench of the Middle Temple,
was appointed a Judge of the High Court of Justice,
Queen's Bench Division, and was knighted. In 1960 and
1961 he served as a Judge of the Restrictive Practices
Court (President in 1961) and in 1961 was appointed a
Lord Justice of Appeal. Lord Justice Diplock was made
an honorary Fellow of University College, Oxford, in
1958, and for the past twelve years has been a member
of the Lord Chancellor's Law Reform Committee. The
topic of his Freund Lecture was "Anti-Trust and the
Judicial Process."
Professor Leon Lipson, of the Yale Law School, speaking to the
student body on "Coercion to Virtue in the Soviet Union­
Non-Courts and Im-Police." His talk was the first of a new series,
held at 11:30 A.M., and intended exclusively for students.
Assistant Dean James M. Ratcliffe, JD'50, Professor Lipson, and
Dean Phil' C. Neal, are shown listening to Professor Philip B.
Kurland, an attitude widespread among the American Bar gen­
erally.
Three Distinguished Alumni
ROSWELL F. MAGILL, JD'20, practiced in Chicago upon
graduation, and during the years 1921-23 served as a
member of the Faculty of the Law School. For the next
two years Mr. Magill was first special attorney and then
chief attorney of the U.S. Treasury Department. He
became a member of the faculty of the Columbia Uni­
versity Law School in 1924 and remained so for twenty­
eight years. He returned to the Treasury Department on
two later occasions, as Assistant to the Secretary, in 1933-
34, and as Undersecretary of the Treasury in 1937-38.
In 1943 Mr. Magill became a partner in the New York
law firm of Cravath, Swaine and Moore, an association
which continued until the time of his death. He was the
author or co-author of some eight books and many peri­
odical articles, principally in the field of Federal taxation.
He served at various times as a Governor of the New
York Stock Exchange, adviser to the Cuban Treasury,
Chairman of the Connecticut Tax Survey Commission,
Chairman of the Tax Foundation and director of the
Macy and Guggenheim Foundations. Mrs. Katherine
Magill, who survives him, was also a graduate of the
School in the Class of 1920.
FOREST D. SIEFKIN, JD'19, was a former Vice-President
and General Counsel of the International Harvester
Company. Following his graduation, he practiced for
four years in Wichita, Kansas, and then spent two years
as a special attorney with the Bureau of Internal Reve­
nue, in Washington. In 1925-27 he practiced with the
Chicago firm of KixMiller and Baar, leaving to serve for
two years on the U.S. Board of Tax Appeals. He joined
Harvester in 1929, and remained with that company,
having been appointed Vice-President and General Coun-
16 The Law School Record Vol. u, No.2
sel in 1946, until his retirement in 1957. From that date
until his death, Mr. Siefkin was counsel to the Chicago
firm of Cummings and Wyman. He served as Consult­
ant on Special Projects to the Executive Office of the
President in 1956-58, for fourteen years as President of
the Village of Glencoe, in which he made his home, and
was a valued member of the Visiting Committee of the
Law School.
In the London Times, last October, the following obit­
uary appeared:
LOUIS H. SILVER, who has died after a painful illness borne
with characteristically impatient fortitude, had been for many
years a prominent hotel-owner in Chicago; graduating to this
exacting profession from the practice of law and having taken his
first degree in engineering. In this country, as in his own, he was
recognized as one of the most puissant book-collectors of our
time. And by his friends he was cherished for his lively imagina­
tion, his generous impulses, and his extraordinary vitality.
Whether talking politics, describing some complex manoeuvres
in pursuit of an incunabula, or laying down the law on any
subject under the sun, Silver was always in motion-his eyes
flashing, his smile mischievous, his hair animated by some pri­
vate wind-machine.
In his earlier years of book-collecting Silver preferred the role
of lone wolf; shying away from the convivial fraternities with
which American bibliophily abounds, shunning publicity, pros­
ecuting his ambitious designs in masterful secrecy, admitting only
a chosen few to the intimacies of his increasingly remarkable
collection of English literary first editions, incunabulae, Renais­
sance and early Continental books, fine bindings, and (more
recently) master drawings. In later years-he was only 61 when he
died-he allowed some of the light to emerge from under the
bushel. He became a trustee of the Newberry Library, a fellow
of the Morgan Library, a member of the Grolier Club. He gave
a notable collection of rare scientific books to the University of
Chicago. He exhibited a selection of his own treasures to the
astonished eyes of the young ladies of Smith College, where one
of his daughters was graduating. It would be absurd to say that
he mellowed (he himself would have scorned the very idea).
But, like a robust burgundy, he matured-and he was still
maturing.
As a collector, Silver was an astute tactician; bold, swift, perti­
nacious, prudent, discriminating. He not only loved his books,
he studied them; and he shared with his devoted wife a relish
for any bibliographical problems they presented. Above all, he
had a wonderful eye for quality. His untimely death, besides
extinguishing a fire before which his many friends delighted to
warm their hands, has also removed a singular ornament from
the world of international connoisseurship.
The Times could not know what alumni and other
friends of the Law School know very well, the deep de­
votion to the School which Louis Silver demonstrated
over the years, and the irreplaceable gap he leaves in its
inmost circle of friends. A member of the Class of 1928,
Mr. Silver was a member of the Board of Directors
of the Law Alumni Association. Mr. Silver leaves a
tangible memorial in the Louis H. Silver Special Collec­
tions Room of the Law Library, and a widespread and
intangible memorial in the memory of his friends and
his School.
The Conservative Fellow Traveler
By MALCOLM P. SHARP
Professor of Law, The University of Chicago Law School
This is a talk given under the auspices of the Conservative Club
of the University of Wisconsin Law School. It is reprinted from the
University of Chicago Law Review, Volume 30, Number 4, Sum­
mer, 1963, with the permission of the Editors of the Review and
of the author.
It is good of you to permit me to talk under this ambigu­
ous title. Since the title is plainly an egotistical one, I
may as well be a little personal about it for a moment.
Since 1950, and particularly from 1950 until 1957, I have
been in and identified with three so-called left-wing
cases: George Anastaplo's bar admission case; the Rosen­
berg and Sobell case; and the proceeding by the Attorney
General to list the National Lawyers Guild, in which,
for a change, I was on the winning side. I am still con­
cerned about George Anastaplo and in efforts to secure
the parole of Morton Sobell. I may have occasion to refer
to these cases in the course of our discussion, but in the
mean time, I want to indicate that I am regarded by
some as. the last of the fellow travelers, in the sense of
those who were so misguided as to use their energies in
behalf of the interests of the Communist Party.
In a second sense, I am also a fellow traveler. My eco­
nomic views, such as they are, are conservative. I have
made it a point not to know whether my friends on the
left were Communists or not, but I have been able to
recognize them as central planners and I have had a fine
time arguing with them about central planning. You
will find my most reactionary statements about my eco­
nomics in speeches made as President of the National
Lawyers Guild, which were published in the Lawyers
Guild Review. In spite of this devotion to what I took to
be their general principles, my conservative liberal econo­
mist friends at the University of Chicago, though doubt­
less appreciating my good points, have quietly com­
plained that I was somewhat muddle-headed in my
economics. For this reason, I suppose I should be called
at the most a fellow traveler of theirs.
In a third more fundamental sense, I am a perennial
fellow traveler. You really need this warning in prepara­
tion for listening to my talk. The only vices I do not have
are the gambling instinct and the instinct of the partisan.
In hiking with Mr. Wilber Katz in the Rockies I made a
famous observation, which you may have heard. Recog­
nizing that we occasionally got lost and did not end up
at our destination, I said that I rejoice in a flexible sense
of objectives. I suppose this has something to do with my
nonpartisan and fellow traveler instincts.
When your spokesman wrote me, I had been reading
about the Vatican Council, particularly the excellent
articles signed by Xavier Rynne in the New Yorker. I
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indicated in my response that I could not certainly call
myself a conservative when tested by what I understand
to be Cardinal Ottaviani's standards. He is the one who
views with alarm, for example, proposals to use the ver­
nacular more extensively in the Mass. I indicated that I
might hope to qualify according to the standards of
Cardinal Bea, who welcomes extended use of the ver­
nacular. He also apparently considers it possible for
Catholics to organize a way of thinking about the uni­
verse which would be consistent not only with the views
of Protestants, but with the views of adherents of other
religions as well, and perhaps even with the views of
those who have no religion.
Oddly enough, I shall want to return to this illustra­
tion for other reasons, but in the mean time I want to
call attention simply to the difficulty about using the
word "conservative." In 1933, enthusiastic New Dealers
sometimes spoke of individualists, particularly business­
men, as "medieval" in their outlook. Nevertheless, it was
plain to many of us then that the syndicalism and guild
socialism which contributed to the vogue of central plan­
ning at the time were themselves, for better or worse, as
a strictly historical matter, more medieval in their ap­
proach to society than the opposed views which were
being vigorously expressed by many businessmen. In this
respect, the New Deal was far more conservative than
Wall Street, or at any rate LaSalle Street, but no one
talked that way at the time.
Then there are those conservative Chinese Stalinists
that we read about, who are resisting the deviationist
ideas of Mr. Khrushchev. On the other hand, there are,
or were, the French Radical Socialists, who are neither
radical nor socialist, but conservative and liberal in the
true or nineteenth-century sense of liberal. Their choice
of a name which indicates the opposite is one of many
indications of the ambivalence and paradox which
govern human affairs, and particularly the affairs of
politics. Everyone is conservative, and everyone is non­
conservative, in the sense that he wants to get rid of some
things in society which he does not like.
It is tempting to appropriate the word conservative for
everything that one thinks of as good. What could be
better than to save and what worse than to destroy? In
a way the point is a good one, and needs to be remem­
bered. In another way, it destroys controversy and in­
hibits growth, which is itself a factor in conservation.
The question is what one wants to conserve and what
one wants to change.
That brings us to another pair, liberty and authority,
freedom and control. No one in his right mind would
want to do without either, and yet here again some
choice is necessary.
"Liberal," in the nineteenth century, came to mean a
minimum of control by human groups, particularly the
state. Yet in those same New Deal days of which we
have spoken, liberal came to mean exactly the opposite.
It came to represent the position of people who thought
that the powers of individuals, and so in a sense their
liberties, could be enhanced by rather sweeping arrange­
ments for help from the state.
There is another use of liberal, in a sense still un­
familiar to us, but familiar in Europe and not unrelated
to some of the things that psychiatrists tell us. The free
person is the well organized person, who is free among
other things from unrecognized "compulsions."
I myself have come more and more to use "liberal"
and "free" in the nineteenth-century sense, and to think
of myself as "conservative" in the sense that I believe in
conserving the kind of freedom which controls the ideas
of "liberals" in the nineteenth-century sense of the word.
I have had the good fortune to be associated with two
groups which seem to me to have adhered to, to have ex­
pressed and to have implemented this kind of liberalism.
I refer you to the LaFollette Progressives in Wisconsin,
whose sound ideas have survived the accidental circum­
stances which occasioned their political difficulties, and
to the University of Chicago liberal economists. If you
are dissatisfied, as I assume and hope you will be, with
my own statement of position, you can read the Univer­
sity of Chicago economists and read about the Wisconsin
Progressives.
With these warnings and observations, I turn to my
own statement of position. The conservative liberal, like
most other people, but to a particular extent, cherishes
four institutions: Religion, the family, property and the
state.
I have already indicated that, as you know, the church
today has its problems. There is not only the tension
between Cardinal Ottaviani and Cardinal Bea. There is
the tension between Catholic and Protestant, Christian
and non-Christian, Fundamentalist and Modernist, be­
liever and atheist, with the campus parallel tension be­
tween the Humanities and the Sciences.
For anyone who has seen something of Catholic doc­
trine, and admired it without adhering to it, the prob­
lems of the Vatican Council have a singular interest. The
conservative by the nature of his position has a consider­
able degree of confidence and pleasure in the universe,
including his own society. The abstract God of the
Greeks and the thirteenth-century Catholic philosophers
may be, for the modern, the feature of the universe which
is associated with confidence and pleasure.
But what do we do with the medieval "soul"? Mag­
nificent as he is in his treatment of the unknown nature
of God, St. Thomas fails dismally in his attempt to trans­
late Plato's poetry into a rather cut and dried account of
the human soul. If immortality is to be used at all in
modern discourse, it must be in quite a different sense
from that of the medieval church, though in a sense not
wholly unrelated to its earlier one. There is the recogni-
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tion that Remembrance of Things Past is not only time­
less but related to superpersonal phenomena, for exam­
ple, pleasure. There is the super-personal interest in life
which leads an elderly atheist like Bertrand Russell to
conduct a courageous campaign against what he con­
ceives to be a threat of death to the species. There is the
similar faith in life which appears in Dr. Zhivago's strug­
gles with the inclement social circumstances of the Rus­
sian Revolution. There is Julian Huxley's faith in a
tendency of the physical universe, with its countless
worlds, to give rise to life. There is the confidence in the
value of the human experience which may be inde­
pendent of impending or ultimate destruction of all the
living matter about which we know.
It is out of such materials that any church, however
ancient, is likely to organize a scheme of things which is
consistent with the cosmology which science, whether
we approve-as I do-or disapprove, is showing us. It is
perhaps not so much the world pictures of religion and
science which require reconciliation, as their methods.
Methods which are inconsistent with those of science are
not likely to persist in either religion or science.
It is, of course, not only the cosmos, including the soul,
with which the church is concerned. It is concerned also
with society, and particularly with society's values. Cardi­
nal Bea says the primary objective of Pope John is
"pastoral": The manifestation' in human relationships of
the "love and kindness" which are the values of Chris­
tianity.
In the Sermon on the Mount, these values are ex­
pressed with startling paradox. Nonviolence consists not
only in refraining from fighting back; it consists also in
not litigating. "If a man sue thee at the law to take away
thy coat, let him have thy cloak also." These are the
words of a Greek text perhaps reporting an Aramaic oral
tradition, but it is hard to gloss them over . We plainly
do not believe them as they are spoken, or take them
seriously, or we would be leaving law schools, both stu­
dents and teachers, at once.
We know that the radical paradox in some passages of
Christian teaching has been put into serviceable form by
the development of medieval and modern ethics. There
may be virtues in the monastic life, or something like it.
In the world of daily life, human values are promoted
and strife and hostility minimized, by the conservative
institutions of the family and property, protected by the
state.
We may stay a little with the next conservative institu­
tion, the family, before passing to the topics which are
today more commonly subjects of controversy between
those calling themselves conservatives and others. Your
generation knows at least as well as mine that changes
have been taking place in our attitudes toward the
family. It is said that there has. been for some generations
an increasing freedom in sexual relationships. The vari-
ous meanings of freedom may well be remembered in
this connection. There is a kind of freedom which in­
cludes opportunity for the great range of sadistic phe­
nomena, from rape to jealousy, which may be associated
with sex. There is, on the other hand, the kind of free­
dom which today facilitates early marriage among stu­
dents, or the creation of informal associations which
apparently in your generation have often a certain stabil­
ity, though they are not organized as marriages. There is
included here opportunity for a free expression of affec­
tion, which is said to be, in your generation, increasingly
the test for relationships between the sexes.
The kinds of freedom suggested by such observations
may still be inconsistent with another kind of freedom,
which is appropriate for the great conservative life pre­
serving functions of marriage. This is the freedom to
form the kind of stable associations appropriate for the
biological and economic functions of rearing and edu­
cating children. The conservative is bound to be confi­
dent in the ability of succeeding generations to carryon
these functions.
One of the many new factors in the relationships be­
tween the sexes is the increasing availability of planned
parenthood. The opportunities of planned parenthood
produce problems about the family itself. They also pro­
duce new opportunities for dealing effectively with the
most critical internal social and economic problems of
the society. The family thus. leads us to the theme of
property, and to the controversial topics about which
conservatives and others argue.
Here, however, I must remind you again of my fellow
traveler propensities. If I am a conservative at all, and
you must judge of that, I am one who considers both
Republicans and Democrats quite often dangerous radi­
cals.
The conservative concerned with the related topics of
poverty and property should, I suggest, consider anyone
who in authority contributes to the neglect of the Mal­
thusian warning, the most dangerous of radicals, at least
after the Russians and the Chinese. The Malthusian
Revolution may prove in the long run a greater threat
to the institutions cherished by the conservative, or any­
one else for that matter, than the Communist Revolution.
Moreover, if one is reluctant to think in such an apoca­
lyptic fashion, it certainly remains true that for some
sections of the world's. populations, for example, Brazil­
ian, . Indian, Chinese, Mississippi or west side Chicago,
Malthus affords a means of economic diagnosis and so
of cure which is as important as anything the conserva­
tive can think about when he is concerned with internal
problems.
One of the distinguished members of our Chicago
group of liberal philosophers and economists is Professor
Abram Harris, a philosopher and economist, and a Ne­
gro. Two or three years ago, we talked together as he
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was preparing a series of lectures on classical economic
theory and its modern uses for delivery at a Negro insti­
tution, Morehouse College in Atlanta. As we talked, and
discussed his observations of population problems on the
neighboring west side, the form of his final lecture grad­
ually evolved.
When he came back, he reported in such a way that I
concluded his final lecture was a success. It was on Mal­
thus with reference to the Negro. In the question hour
afterwards, he reported that there had been a lively dis­
cussion of planned parenthood and population control.
In response to a question from one young woman, he
had said, "If you have fifteen children, you will have
trouble improving your status." This was doubtless a
rough appeal to self-interest on the part of a group with
special hungers for status, but it referred in context to
the general trend of the discussion.
He went back a few months later, and talked with
some of his sociologist friends at Morehouse. One of
them, apparently representing the views of others, said,
"You are expecting too much of people. They will have
to be given money."
There are indications that the problem of poverty is
for the first time about to become a center of attention
in the United States. The books reviewed by Dwight
MacDonald and his own generally excellent review in
the January 19, 1963 New Yorker, seem to be an indica­
tion of a new kind of interest in the subject. In Illinois
problems of relief are more and more the center of gen­
eral attention as they occasion on the whole more and
more public debate and controversy.
There are two principal themes in the discussion. One
is that poor and rich alike are interested in the self­
respect of the poor and their ability to take care of them­
selves. Large numbers of our Chicago poor, many of
them Negroes and some fresh from the South, are learn­
ing to read and write as a first step in equipping them­
selves for work in an urban society. Encouragement, or
at least opportunity, for planned parenthood is one ele­
ment in the development of self-respect and self-reliance
on the part of the poor, and encouragement to planned
parenthood on the part of those on relief is currently one
of our major local issues in Illinois.
The other theme is that our expenditures for all sorts
of social welfare purposes might well be reconsidered in
the light of the needs of the poor. Professor Milton Fried­
man, who is the most articulate spokesman for our
liberal economists at Chicago, estimates that if about
one-half of our expenditures for social welfare, local,
state and national, were used annually in the form of
negative income taxes, that is, money payments, to those
who are really pOof, there would be a considerable im­
provement in their condition. His estimate is in fact that
this sum would make it possible to raise the incomes of
the members of the lowest one-fifth of income recipients
to a point where they would all receive an equal mini­
mum. This would apparently be something in the neigh­
borhood of 4,000 dollars for a standard family of three.
His point is, of course, that our preoccupation with
other classifications than that of the poor, for example
farmers or laboring men, has led us to make contribu­
tions to their welfare which are not proportionate to the
degree of their poverty. In some cases, for example that
of the farmers, considerable resources are devoted to im­
proving the income of large numbers who would in any
case have more than the average per capita income of the
community as a whole.
The two elements in what may be an emerging policy,
self-reliance on the one hand and more money for the
poor on the other, may be reconciled in all sorts of ways,
which I will leave it to you to think about. Care for the
indigent has been a familiar policy of all modern con­
servatives. It is not so much that the really poor threaten
revolution, as at the present they surely do not. It is
rather that a hard heart is not characteristic of the true
conservative. On the contrary, I think it could be argued
that the conservative liberal is by and large less hard­
hearted than the collectivist radical. In any case, the con­
servative is likely to have a strong distaste for misery and
A portion of the special exhibit arranged in the Louis H. Silver
Special Collections Room of the Law Library by Reference Li­
brarian Frances Hall, honoring the publication of the book, Black
Robe and Grass Skirt, by Mr. and Mrs. Philip Toomin. Mr.
Toomin, JD'26, served as Judge of the High Court of the u.S.
Trust Territories, in the Samoas; the book grew out of his ex­
periences there.
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squalor and a strong impulse toward building a society
which he can view with satisfaction.
Accordingly, I am a little surprised at what has hap­
pened in Illinois to at least one Republican leader, who
might have been expected to support the hypothesis I
have just suggested, but who seems to contradict it. At
the last election, I voted for a number of Republicans,
particularly three who were associated in some of the
newspaper discussions with Mr. Charles Percy of Bell &
Howell, who may prove the Illinois parallel to Mr.
Romney and Mr. Scranton. Particularly, I voted for Mr.
William Scott for State Treasurer.
Unless I learn something to correct my present impres­
sion, I shall not vote for him again. Though the issues
are not quite that simple, my view is that he has shown
himself a dangerous radical in declining to support a
leading businessman, Mr. Arnold Marernont, this time
a Democrat, in what promised to be an effective program
for actively encouraging the exercise of family planning
by women on relief. As I say, the issues are complicated,
and the program at issue- involves use of state funds in
ways which might be objectionable, except that the
whole effort is one to remove social and legal obstacles to
family planning on the part of the poorest members of
the community, and the ones whose children are likely to
be born under the most miserable of circumstances and
with the most ominous futures. You will see that I con­
sider Mr. Scott a far more dangerous radical than Mr.
Gus Hall of the Communist Party, since Mr. Scott is
promoting an internal revolution which seriously
threatens us, not now perhaps with disorder, but with
growing neighborhoods of misery.
One may ask, if one is interested in Mr. Milton Fried­
man's proposal, what would happen if it should be car­
ried further? An equal division of disposable income
would give statistical families of three some 6,000 dollars
a year at current levels of population and income. That
would eliminate the two lower groups with which Mr.
Dwight MacDonald particularly concerns himself, those
with family incomes of 4,000 dollars or less and those
with family incomes between 6,000 and 4,000 dollars.
This would, of course, be communism in a familiar gen­
eral sense.
Suppose for the moment that such a situation could be
maintained without any effect on standards of living or
employment, of course a questionable assumption. What
would be the effect on the poor? It would, of course, be
good in some obvious ways. But would it be good on
balance? Social workers tell us that a sense of dependency
is bad not only for the productivity, but for the happi­
ness of the poor. We have learned that the over-protected
child is likely to experience frustration, defeat and un­
happiness. There was a time when one heard of farmers
receiving agricultural adjustment checks and angrily
chasing the person who brought them off the farm. From
the point of view of the softhearted conservative, this is
the first answer, and I think an appropriate one, to all
the appeals for egalitarian equality which can be made
by a thoughtful Communist. The second answer is, of
course, that our original assumption is an unrealistic one.
What would be likely to happen to standards of living
and employment can be imagined if one tries to imagine
the kind of industrial depression which would be created
by such a hypothetical division of income.
It is not the poor who have been the principal concern
of Marx or Plato or indeed of most modern, more or less
radical, collectivists. The simple poor were a subject of
scorn by Marx, and it is the farmer and laborer, particu­
larly the organized laborer, who are likely to be the favor­
ites of contemporary political reform. There are many
illustrations which result from these differences of ap­
proach. The Negro illustrates many things in our society,
and we may return to him for an illustration.
The lowest per capita income in the country is in
Mississippi, and our most miserable slums are our rural
slums, not our urban ones. Just the other evening I had
a vivid illustration of these observations in talking with
a social worker friend, who is the wife of a leading
corporation lawyer in our city. She spoke of an old
Negro lady, fresh from a marginal farm somewhere in
Missouri, who was having a miserable time adjusting in
our west side urban slums near the University. In the
midst of her troubles, this old lady was asked if she did
not want to go back to the Missouri farm. With all the
emphasis she could command she said, "No!" She had
not had enough to eat there, or anything else, and she
preferred to live in the most squalid part of our me­
tropolis, with all its contrasts.
What happens when minimum wages are imposed in
the South, or a union wage scale well above the mini­
mum level, is seen in a community where there is a meat
packing establishment, a textile mill or a steel mill. An
obstacle is, of course, imposed on the movement which
would otherwise take place from farm to city. I spent
some time in 1933 working with a representative of the
textile industry whose mills were in Rhode Island, de­
veloping the plans for narrowing differentials which
were put into effect by the NRA. My mill owner friend
was an honest and, as the saying went, statesmanlike
leader who disliked poverty, and wanted to check its
appearance in his Rhode Island community. Nevertheless
his position required him to recognize that he was pre­
venting the really poor in the South from exercising their
choice to move from the farms where income was worse
to the manufacturing centers where they would receive
more, meager though it might be. My understanding is
that the packing house workers in recent negotiations
have been modest and conservative in making their in­
evitable demands for raising southern wages and narrow­
ing the differential in their industry, because of the con-
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siderations to which I have drawn attention. On the
other hand, the steel workers have eliminated their dif­
ferential, and thus made Birmingham less available as a
haven for the poor farmers, of the surrounding area.
I need hardly say that the effect of such restrictions
will vary with conditions of employment and prosperity,
but I think there can be no doubt that a significant
obstacle to improvement in the condition of farmers is
imposed by relatively high wage scales in cities. His­
torians of the New Deal speak with enthusiasm of the
gains for labor made in the thirties. This was, I believe,
the first time in our history when real wages stayed
steady during a recovery from depression, when money
wages, that is, kept pace with rising prices. The his-
torians are too likely to forget the persistence of mass un­
employment until 1939, when it may be that the im­
provement which took place was due to economic influ­
ences connected with the onset of the European war.
These are reminders of the extent to which, often at
the expense of the seriously poor, farmer and laborer
have been the favorites of reformers, radicals and col­
lectivists. Lest the tone should sound too denunciatory, I
hasten to say that those latter groups composed a large
section of the population, perhaps even including me,
during the thirties; and that the difference is perhaps
more one of time and of experience than of individual
wisdom.
However that may be, real wages both here and abroad
The Hinton Moot Court Competition Committee for 1963-64, left to right, seated: Laurel McKee, AB., University of Chicago; David
Paulsen, S.B., Brigham Young University, Secretary; Jerome Marcus, S.B., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Vice-Chairman; Robert
Johnson, AB., Kalamazoo College, Chairman; Peter Thauer, A.B., Princeton University, Vice-Chairman; and Sandra Bixby, AB.,
Syracuse University. Standing, left to right: Harry A. Crandall, B.A., University of Illinois; Alvin Hirshen; A.B., College of the City
of New York; John Daniels, A.B., Princeton University; William Hanley, A.B., University of Notre Dame; Douglas Costle, A.B., Har­
vard University; Richard Fine, S.B., University of Wisconsin; Allen Faurot, AB., Stanford University; Darryl Fohrman, A.B., University
of Michigan; James Rainey, S.B., University of Notre Dame; King V. Cheek, AM., University of Chicago, and James Krasnoo, AB.,
Harvard University.
22 The Law School Record Vol. 12, No.2
are, of course, at the highest point in history, and at
present the Marxist prophecy of increasing misery in
capitalist society appears to have been answered nega­
tively. Another Marxist prophecy, the prophecy of in­
creasing monopolization, has been quite as clearly dis­
posed of. When I was a boy, we used to lie awake wor­
rying about the anthracite monopoly. Where is it now?
When I first met the aviation industry in 1918, there was
very little aluminum anywhere about. The aluminum
industry, which not so long ago was our front page
monopoly and which perhaps has benefited by steps to
increase competition within the industry, has made its
way by competing with other materials performing iden­
tical functions. We read today that Alcoa and the United
States Steel Corporation are competing on products to
make better cans, and neither Alcoa nor the Steel Corpo­
ration ("The Corporation") has now anything like the
position which the public attributed to it a few short
years ago. The one threatening case of industrial monop­
oly, the automobile industry, is no longer an exhibit for
Marxists, since Mr. Romney and the Europeans have
brought it back to normal.
Our critical controversial issues today are no longer
issues of protecting farmer and labor monopolies or ac­
cepting what turns out to be a nonexistent trend toward
enterprise monopoly. The principal contemporary inter­
nal economic problem for conservatives, after poverty, is
the problem of subsidy and spending.
Transportation is the industry which has the longest
history of subsidy. The bankruptcy of publicly aided
canals and toll roads was responsible for the appearance
in many western constitutions, including the Wisconsin
constitution, of prohibitions against or restrictions on
state borrowing and so state spending. The western rail­
roads were favored with land grants. The automobile in­
dustry was partly the creature of public roads.
I recall in this connection one incident in the course of
some modest brain trusting I did for Governor Philip
LaFollette in preparation for his first administration in
1931. Though I had no special connection with this
project, I sat with a group of farmer legislators who were
planning what was then an innovation, a gasoline tax
by which the users of roads could pay for them. One of
the legislators said with great feeling, "I voted for the
first paved road in Wisconsin, and I wish my arm had
been cut off."
This particular subsidy has been to a considerable ex­
tent corrected, but its effects linger . We are finding that
we must now pay not only for roads but for competing
forms of transportation which they have almost super­
seded, the transit systems and railroads which serve large
cities.
The farmer's subsidies may be thought of as means to
soften the consequences of the technological changes
which are requiring and effecting an inevitable move
from country to city. So far as unions are responsible for
them, the union wage scales are, of course, a form of
taxation and subsidy, and the costs occasioned by union
proposals to alleviate the hardships resulting from techno­
logical change may be compared with agricultural ad­
j ustment payments.
The most interesting forms of public payment are
now, however, of another sort. Urban development is
still a small item in our national budget, but it is an in­
structive one, and its enthusiasts say that it will take 125
billion dollars to do the job which they envisage. This
will be much more than our agricultural program has
cost since the War, 1 and much more than the moon shot
for which we are expecting to pay about 30 billion dol­
lars. All these items are, however, still modest in com­
parison with our payments to the industries which sup­
ply us with weapons and the forces which use them.
Besides poverty, and not so dearly related to. it as some
think, these public expenditures produce the second of
the two great internal social and economic problems for
the modern conservative. Mr. Kennedy is no doubt a
conservative individual. He is a Catholic and a man of
wealth, and he does not appear to have the demagogic
talents and impulses which have distinguished some of
our reforming presidents. I would like to use demagogic
in an almost colorless sense in this context, and I use it
only because I cannot think of a better word. But by the
test of his inclination to make public finance the means
of vast economic change, Mr. Kennedy is this time the
dangerous radical. Looking forward a little, I may say
that I shall find him on balance, when foreign policy is
taken into account, a less dangerous radical than either
Mr. Rockefeller or Mr. Goldwater, so I urge you not to
get ahead of me in putting me in one party or the other.
I live in an area which is a subject of urban redevelop­
ment. I am to be for a week or two more in a solid apart­
ment building about to be demolished to make a school
playground addition which the Chicago Board of Educa­
tion, comparing it with teachers and buildings, does not
urgently want. For me the problems of urban develop­
ment have thus a peculiar fascination.
1 An observer of the argument from analogy knows that for every
similarity between objects or abstractions there is always one difference,
and quite often there are many more. One difference between our farm
program and urban renewal is that it is not expected that any of the
buildings built or improved by urban renewal will be put into bins. The
most responsible proponents of urban renewal expect that the major part
of its costs will be financed by private investment. Some apparently
contemplate much higher costs than those mentioned here, and some
apparently advocate various amounts of expenditure regardless of the
availability of private investment. It will be observed that contemplated
expenditures are in any event much lower than corresponding figures
for military expenditures, especially if these include payments on account
of past wars. Urban renewal might be used as one means of alleviating
anxieties, whether reasonable or-as I think-unreasonable, about the
possible economic effects of cuts in expenditures for military purposes.
More important, it might be used to draw our attention to the pleasures
of spending for means of life rather than for means of destruction.
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Considered even abstractly, they would require a
pretty extended treatment. Saving a great university like
the University of Chicago may seem to anyone brought
up in Madison a suitable use of public funds. But when
one leaves a university neighborhood or a hospital or a
public building neighborhood, and goes, for example, to
our near north side, the problems become troublesome
indeed. Weare, among other things, zoning against
slums, in fact as things stand today particularly Negro
slums, while facilitating living for middle and upper in­
come Negroes and whites alike. Weare using public
funds derived ultimately from those who pay sales and
income taxes, including the lower income groups who
pay twenty per cent of federal personal income taxes, to
pay for expenses incurred in building middle and upper
income housing. Those with incomes below the average
belong in a group whose taxes as a whole are regressive
when measured by income. In principle these taxes
might be the first to be reduced by any decrease in public
spending. We may be simply chasing the slums around
the city, as one phrase has it, or pushing them back to
Mississippi and Birmingham. We may also be stimu­
lating house and apartment building beyond the limits
which free private choices would set.
Particularly if one thinks of the 125 billion dollars, the
problem becomes pretty big for our present discussion.
We may take something a little simpler like the moon
trip. Here the concise observations of Mr. Warren
Weaver, an old University of Wisconsin mathematician
and now a Rockefeller Foundation executive, may serve
to jog our imaginations. Writing in the Saturday Review
of last August 4th, Mr. Weaver summed the matter up
in a few concise paragraphs, including the following:
It has been forecast that it may cost $30 billion to "put a man on
the moon." But how much is $30 billion: It is sobering to think
of an alternative set of projects that might be financed with this
Ulrich Drobnig, Dr.Jur., University of Hamburg, �eaching.Fel­
low and Instructor in the Foreign Law Program, begins a seminar.
sum. We could: give a 10 per cent raise in salary, over a ten-year
period, to every teacher in the United States, from kindergarten
through universities, in both public and private institutions (about
$9.8 billion); give $10 million each to 200 of the best smaller col­
leges ($2 billion); finance seven-year fellowships (freshman
through Ph.D.) at $4,000 per person per year for 50,000 new scien­
tists and engineers ($1.4 billion); contribute $200 million each
toward the creation of ten new medical schools ($2 billion); build
and largely endow complete universities, with medical, engineer­
ing, and agricultural faculties for all fifty-three of the nations
which have been added to the United Nations since its original
founding ($13.2 billion); create three more permanent Rockefeller
Foundations ($15 billion) ; and still have $100 million left over to
popularize science.
Whether you are primarily concerned with national welfare,
international prestige, or science, weigh these alternatives against
a man on the moon.
Urban development, the moon shot and the procure­
ment and use of weapons are precursors and moderate
intimations of the problems which we should face in
what we vaguely think of as a socialized American econ­
omy. The prospect has a certain grandeur. It may be
supposed that the integrity, ability, industry and care of
the human being are sufficient to insure the operation of
such a society. Even so, would it not be better to leave us
more and more of the dollars we earn?
The word "better" reminds us that bit by bit, we have
been developing materials for checking the evaluative
judgment which has been implicit in much that has been
said. It may now appear that the liberty of the nine­
teenth-century liberal, the maximum possible freedom
from group control, is consistent with and conducive to
the development of the other freedoms. It is likely to
enhance the self-respect and self-reliance of poor and
rich alike, and so increase the wealth which promotes
freedom as power. The conservative liberal's freedom
from group control is a necessary, if not indeed a suffi­
cient, condition for the development of the organized
person, who is free for example from compulsions, in the
sense of the psychoanalyst and the Stoic alike. It may
even appear that we have disposed of the supposed ten­
sions between liberty and security, and between liberty
and "equality" in its most useful sense.
Before we pass to the state, one observation-perhaps
in the nature of a footnote-should be made about prop­
erty and our economic problems. There are some eco­
nomic problems with respect to which a judgment of
feasibility, as amoral as a judgment about the operation
of the Skybolt missile, is of considerable importance.
People who seem to me to have the best credentials as
conservative liberals differ about the consequences of the
proposed tax cut which is now so critical an economic
issue in public discussion. Some of my friends with good
qualificaitons both as conservative liberals and as· special­
ists, think the tax cut cannot, except perhaps by means
of incantation, produce either the good or the bad effects
which are prophesied. If, as seems to be expected, our
Government operations are financed in place of the taxes
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by an equivalent amount of borrowing from the general
public, there is no reason, at least in economic circum­
stances like those of the present, why the change should
add or subtract a nickel to or from the supply of money
available for the nation's business. This is in the first
instance a question of means rather than end.
Some of my conservative liberal friends who have this
view about what may be called the mechanics of the
problem, advocate the tax reduction on the ground that
it is likely to encourage people to want more tax reduc­
tion and so eventually a reduction of Government spend­
ing. Others, and I confess in my amateur way I am
inclined to agree with them, are opposed to the tax re­
duction, partly because its good effects can be produced
only by a kind of deception, and partly because it is likely
to take our minds off the objections to public spending.
One group of conservative liberals thinks our money
should be frankly made by a well-controlled printing
press and that we should cease to have what little regard
we still show for gold. They think our society is capable
of writing rules for the printing press, which will save
us from the kind of inflation which we have seen, for
example, in many Latin American countries. They think
the printing press is generally in control now, but in
concealed control, not subject to rules, and subject to
irrational and accidental checks by our occasional con­
cern for gold.
Other conservative liberals, and I am inclined to agree
with them, have an old fashioned attachment to the
slight regard which we do indeed pay to gold. Those of
this opinion recognize that an excessive regard for gold
could lead us into a deep depression, and that before that
happens, we had better turn to the controlled printing
press solution. We hope no such emergency will arise,
and we are confident that here again a Marxist prophecy,
of inevitable and constantly deepening depressions, is
The Board of Directors of the Law Student Association for 1%3-64, left to right: Frank M. Grazioso, B.A., Yale University; Nicholas
J. Basen, B.A., University of Illinois; James J. McNamara, B.A., University of Notre Dame; Alex P. Bouxsein, B.A., Carnegie Institute;
Steve M. Barnett, B.A., Carleton College; Jewel R. Naxon, B.A., Brandeis University; Daniel P. Kearney, B.A., Michigan State University;
Thomas A. Ross, B.A., St. Mary's College; Alan R. Orschel, B.A., Dartmouth College, President; Elizabeth Ellenbogen, B.A., University of
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The officers of the Edwin F. Mandel Legal Aid Clinic for 1963-64,
seated, left to right: Melinda Bass, A.B., Bryn Mawr College,
Edward Burgh, A.B., University of Chicago, Chairman; and Frank
Dunbar, A.B., Ohio Wesleyan University. Standing: Frederick
Henzi, A.B., University of Chicago; and Ronald Kolins, A.B.,
University of Connecticut.
being answered. Here we may indeed not be so sure as
we are about some of the other Marxist prophecies, and
we may be prepared for critical new solutions in any im­
pending serious decline in employment and production.
This brings us to the state. Besides the questions of
social and economic liberty with which we have been
concerned, there is the persistent tension between free­
dom of communication and order, to which our society
has given a conservative liberal solution. It is true that
our Constitution, properly read, seems to indicate that
the solution is for voters and their representatives and
not the courts. It is also true that from 1948 to 1957, and
particularly from 1950 to 1954, both voters and their rep­
resentatives committed striking and instructive violations
of our tradition. In doing so, they gave a rather moderate
exhibition of what life in a Fascist state has been like and
what life in a Communist state must also be like.
My friend, George Anastaplo, who refused to answer
bar admission committee questions about his politics, is
in fact the staunchest anti-Communist I know. He has
never been any sort of a Collectivist in his economic
thinking. He was a bomber navigator during WorId
War II, and at the time of his first bar admission pro­
ceedings in 1951 he insisted that I conceal a remark of
his to the effect that he would like to keep his reserve
commission because he felt committed to fight, in case
war came, against the Soviet Union.
By an amusing coincidence, he was put out of the
Soviet Union in the course of a European trip in the
summer of 1960. He had been photographing and talk­
ing with two other Americans and an English girl, who
were themselves bein.g arrested for taking pictures and
distributing our State Department exchange magazine.
The Russian police picked him up, took his film, and
sent him out of the country. He has written amusingly
about it. Among other things, he said, "My impression
was that the police major conducting the investigation,
which turned out to be a 'trial,' was not accustomed to
forthrightness on the part of accused persons: the pro­
ceedings opened with my refusal to hand over my cam­
era for removal of the film until I had received from
them a statement of their legal justification for such a
request; the major had the expression of one who was
watching a strange creature from another world."
The similarity between the Russian police and the
Character and Fitness Committee of the Chicago Bar
must strike a detached observer. Nevertheless, Mr. Ana­
staplo has always been more impressed with the differ­
ence. In this same account of his arrest in Russia, he
observes that the only literature he left behind was a
copy of his closing argument to the Committee, printed
in the Lawyers Guild Review, which he gave to a young
man with whom he was talking. "I added a dedicatory
inscription, 'To a Russian: On how free men contend.":"
Not only in the Anastaplo case, but also in the tragic
Sobell case, I think some who have criticized what they
took to be the penalization of opinion in a time of stress,
have been among the strongest of anti-Communists. The
Anastaplo case and the Sobell case are remnants of the
McCarthy period, the period surrounding the Korean
War, when in my judgment the conservative liberal po­
sition required resistance to the spirit of the times, re­
spectably represented though it was in such organizations
as our bar associations.
2 It should be observed that Mr. Anastoplo remains convinced of the
advantages of travel in Russia, and of communication between Russians
and others. His views are expressed in the following letter published in
The London Observer, August 14, 1960:
EXPELLED
Sir, I should like, as a recent visitor to the Soviet Union, to take
issue with Mr. John Wain's suggestion that Western tourists provide
that country with "unpaid propaganda work when they get home."
Almost invariably the fellow tourists with whom my wife, children
and I exchanged impressions at the end of each day shared our serious
reservations about the dreary, uncomfortable, restricted and monu­
mentally tasteless life the Russian people seem to have had imposed
upon them. The tourists with whom we came in contact most were
young people using the camping facilities we lived in outside Minsk,
Smolensk and Moscow.
Visits by tourists provide a valuable source of information for both
the West and Russians. The eagerness of Soviet citizens to talk to and
question visitors reflects their interest in the outside world.
I should like to urge increased contacts of the kind that only tourists
can make. I say this despite the fact I was expelled from the Soviet
Union last month, midpoint in a two-week visit, for having presumed
first, to photograph and then to attempt to counsel three American and
English students detained (and subsequently expelled) for allegedly
distributing copies of the United States State Department exchange
magazine, Amerika, on a Moscow street.
George Anastaplo,
Lecturer in the Liberal Arts
The University of Chicago
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For the moment, and it is to be hoped for some time
ahead, this particular problem has receded considerably
in public importance. Nevertheless, when we think of
what the cold war is about, we may usefully remember it.
One thing that the cold war is about is the preservation
of our social and economic organization against the threat
of demoralization, depression or physical destruction at
the hands of Russian and perhaps Chinese Communists.
When we say that we would not like to be "red" and
would perhaps even prefer to be dead, we have in mind
such social and economic demoralization as is pictured
by Pasternak in Dr. Zhivago, particularly in vivid de­
scriptive passages dealing with life in Russia in the time
of Lenin. We have in mind also a situation in which in
the time of Khrushchev, Pasternak was able to publish
his novel only by stealth, and was prevented from re­
ceiving his Nobel Prize. Faulkner, though he was at­
tacked by citizens of his state, was not prevented even
by Mississippi from receiving his prize; and though the
Russian action has a kind of parallel, as an example of
pure or ideal tyranny, in the Anastaplo case, we have
seen also that, as George Anastaplo reminds us, his own
circumstances here were vastly different from those of
Mr. Pasternak in Russia.
Like the values involved in our economic liberties, the
values involved here are worth reflection and analysis.
We shall have to leave them as they stand with the re­
minder that, if I am right, such labels as conservative
when used by an excited community may be misleading.
The true conservative was in my opinion not an admirer
of McCarthy in the United States, Franco in Spain,
Mussolini in Italy, Hitler in Germany, any more than of
Khrushchev in Russia or Mao in China.
The most critical problem of the state today is plainly
the problem of the cold war. It is a problem not only
for each individual country, but for that perhaps emerg­
ing consciousness of association which may contain ma­
terials for something like a world state.
What is the position of the conservative liberal here?
I should say at the outset that since 1959 I have described
my own position. as that of a pacifist, and a believer in
unilateral disarmament. I am not quite a systematic paci­
fist, for that would make me a philosophical anarchist.
.
While I sometimes call myself an anarchist, particularly
in left wing circles, I am perhaps more accurately de­
scribed, at least so far as the present discussion has gone,
as a Republican. So far as my pacifism goes, I have had
the greatest difficulty in associating myself with other
pacifists, a difficulty of a sort which I have never before
experienced. Given our present policy, I find it impossible
to criticize segments of it, like coolheaded vigilance over
spies and saboteurs, coolheaded preparation of shelters,
tests, plans for limitedwarfare, plans for controlled ther­
monuclear warfare, the satellite program so far as it may
have military significance, and particular weapons pro-
grams. My belief in unilateral disarmament is in decisive
but negotiated action, not the kind of piecemeal steps
which in the best practical judgment available would
tend to invite attack.
You will see that my position is a Utopian one, and
so far as I know with virtually no agreement on the part
of any practical person in the United States. I state it
partly to enable you to discount the more down to earth
judgment to which I am now proceeding. In my view,
there are practically no leading western statesmen who
take what I should call a sound conservative liberal
position on these problems. I will suggest indeed that
there are only two, Eisenhower and De Gaulle.
I invite your attention to President Eisenhower's for­
eign policy, which in my judgment was the only rational
foreign policy which any American president has prac­
ticed since 1917. Until May of 1960, it seemed possible
that it would be successful. I think that under the influ­
ences that were in control in the Eisenhower administra­
tion, it might eventually have recovered and succeeded
even after the U-2 episode. I consider Mr. Khrushchev's
reaction to the U-2 episode to be his worst failure, what­
ever his reasons, in his conduct of foreign policy. It was
a critical example of the effect which overexcitement
about routine espionage or reconnaissance may produce,
in some circumstances, on international relations.
Today De Gaulle is the leading symbol of the view,
which he is thought to entertain still, that Russia should
be brought back into the western world. He has com­
bined ingeniously his devotion to French glory and pres­
tige with vigorous action to remove the liabilities of the
French African empire, and with what appears to be
quiet, though ambivalent acceptance of Russian power.
It seems to me that this is the appropriate practical
conservative liberal position. Whatever may be said about
financial support for the family farm or the redeveloped
city, a conservative liberal should be ready to go to great
extremes to prevent the demolition of farms and cities
alike. If Mr. Herman Kahn is read carefully, that leading
and very thoughtful student of thermonuclear war is not
as confident as he at first sounds that our farms and coun­
try towns would survive a 1968 thermonuclear war any
better than our cities. So good a conservative as Pope Pius
XII, not by an.y means a pacifist, has unqualifiedly con­
demned a war of annihilation by modern weapons. It
need hardly be said that the Sermon on the Mount can
be read to the same effect.
Tested by these standards, we have no conservative
liberal political leaders now in active political life in the
United States. Mr. Goldwater and Mr. Rockefeller to­
gether with the New York Senators who are renewing
the threat of war with Russia over Cuba, are by this test
dangerous radicals. Conserving the life of the human
species or the life of human inhabitants of the northern
hemisphere, or the life of the United States, or even. the
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achievements of civilization, seems an appropriate con­
servative objective. Compared with General Eisenhower
or General De Gaulle,Mr. Kennedy and his advisors may
seem to be radicals, but compared with Mr. Goldwater
and Mr. Rockefeller, they seem to be conservative. While
maintaining a deterrent, they appear determined to mini­
mize the present chances of destruction of the human
life on which the continued actual existence of human
value depends.
You will see what I mean by the phrase "fellow trav­
eler." I have exposed myself to your critical view in my
attitude toward the various institutions which are inev­
itably cherished by anyone who may be called in any
sense a conservative, that means by us all. The conserv­
ative attitude is an indispensable part of the human
makeup, just as is the attitude which recognizes the need
for superseding some old ways and replacing them by
new. I have rashly touched on nearly all possible subjec�s.
If the discussion is of any use to you, it must be not III
affording you adequately supported proposals, but in
indicating what in my opinion, at any rate, are the �ub­
jects deserving emphasis in the thought of. conservatives,
and in suggesting approaches to these subjects.
Students in the first year of the graduate Foreign La� Program
during 1963-64; standing, left to right: Walker D. M�ller, LL.B:,
University of Colorado; John G. Roach, LL.B., Washington Uni­
versity; and Tipton S. Blish, J.D., University of Chicago. Seated:
George P. Fletcher, J.D., University of Chicago; and Robert J.
Marousek, J.D., Northwestern University.
Two Notable Conferences
Earlier in the academic year, the Law School co-spon­
sored two conferences on timely topics. The first, on
"Religious Freedom and Public Affairs" was arranged
in cooperation with the National Conference of Chris­
tians and Jews. After an informal opening dinner, featur­
ing welcoming remarks from Dean Phil C. Neal and
Dr. Lewis Webster Jones, President of the National Con­
ference, the first session devoted itself to a discussion of
a paper on "The Implications of the Supreme Cou:t
Decisions Dealing with Religious Practices in the Public
Schools," by Jefferson B. Fordham, Dean and Professor
of Law, the University of Pennsylvania Law School. The
session was chaired by Philip B. Kurland, Professor of
Law, The University of Chicago Law School. Commen­
tators were William J. Butler, Esq., of the New York
Bar, and Paul G. Kauper, Professor of Law, the Univer­
sity of Michigan Law School.
The second session was chaired by the Reverend Rob­
ert F. Drinan, S.J., Dean and Professor of Law, Boston
College Law School. The basic paper, on "The Proble�
of Standing To Sue," was presented by Kenneth C. DaVIS,
John P. Wilson Professor of Law at The University of
Chicago Law School. Commenting were John deJ. Pem­
berton, of the American Civil Liberties Union and Rob­
ert E. Rodes, Jr., Associate Professor of Law, University
of Notre Dame Law School. At the third session, the
only one open to the public, the Honorable Abraha� A.
Ribicoff, JD'33, United States Senator from Connecticut,
spoke on "School Financing and the Religious Contro­
versy."
The final day of the conference opened with a discus­
sion of "The Constitutional Status of Public Funds for
Church-Related Schools," by Harry W. Jones, Cardozo
Professor of Jurisprudence at Columbia University, and
Visiting Professor of Law at the University of Chicag�.
Commentators were William Ball, of the Pennsylvania
Bar, and Boris I. Bittker, Southmayd Professor of Law,
Yale Law School. Chairman of the session was Wilber
G. Katz, Professor of Law, the University of Wisconsin
Law School. The concluding session, presided over by
Theodore Leskes, of the American Jewish Committee,
heard a principal paper on "Litigation as a Method of
Handling Conflicts Concerned with Religion and Edu­
cation in a Pluralistic Society," by Rabbi Arthur Gilbert,
of the National Conference of Christians and Jews. Com­
mentators were Milton R. Konvitz, Professor of Law,
Cornell Law School, and Jack W. Peltason, Dean of the
College of Arts and Sciences of the University of Illinois.
"Discrimination and the Law" was the subject of the
second conference, jointly sponsored by the Law School
and the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith. The
conference opened with a paper on discrimination in
employment, by Vern Countryman, of Harvard Law
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The Conference on Discrimination and the Law, in session in the
Weymouth Kirkland Courtroom. Facing the camera, left to right,
are Alexander M. Bickel, Professor of Law, Yale University, Phil
C. Neal, Dean and Professor of Law, The University of Chicago
Law School, presiding, and John Kaplan, Associate Professor of
Law, Northwestern University.
School, with critiques offered by William R. Ming, Jr.,
JD'33, of the Chicago Bar and Jerre S. Williams, Pro­
fessor of Law, the University of Texas. Dean Erwin
Griswold, of Harvard Law School, presided. The second
session was devoted to a paper on discrimination in pub­
lic accommodations by Alexander M. Bickel, Professor
of Law, Yale Law School, and critiques by William
Coleman, of the Philadelphia Bar, and Professor John
Kaplan, Northwestern University Law School. Phil C.
Neal, Dean of the Law School of the University of Chi­
cago, presided.
The principal paper of the third session, chaired by
Dean Jacob Hyman, of the University of Buffalo School
of Law, was devoted to discrimination in public accom­
modations; the author, Thomas P. Lewis, Professor of
Law at the University of Kentucky and Visiting Profes­
sor at the University of Washington. Jo Desha Lucas,
Professor of Law, The University of Chicago Law School,
and the Reverend Robert F. Drinan, S.J., Dean and
Professor of Law, Boston College Law School, offered
the critiques.
Jefferson B. Fordham, Dean and Professor of Law, the
University of Pennsylvania Law School, presided over
the final session, which dealt with discrimination in
housing. The central paper was presented by Harold
Horowitz, Office of the General Counsel, Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare; critiques were given by
Norman Dorsen, Professor of Law at New York Uni­
versity, and Francis A. Allen, University Professor, The
University of Chicago Law School.
A different view of the conferees, showing some of the observers
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Still Uneasy
The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation, by Professors Walter
T. Blum and Harry Kalven, Jr., of the Law Faculty, was published
in 1953 by the University of Chicago Press, and has already be­
come a classic in its field. A few months ago, it was reprinted
in the University of Chicago Press's paperback series, Phoenix
Books, with a lengthy new introduction. With the permission of
the authors and the Press, the first three sections of that intro­
duction are here reprinted.
1
Some years ago we engaged in a program to gain em­
pirical knowledge relating to the progression question.
The University of Chicago Law School had undertaken
a series of projects in what was called law and behavioral
science in an effort to apply the research techniques of
the social sciences to the study of legal problems and
institutions. As part of this program, we started to ex­
plore the community sense of justice as it related to the
tax burden. The key method of inquiry was that of the
large-scale public opinion survey, and at the core of the
study was the objective of assessing popular attitudes
toward progressive taxation.' For a variety of reasons
the study was never completed, but the experience with
it provides a refreshing stimulus to further reflection about
progresSlOn.
We were determined to probe how deeply the public
was committed to progression and on what basis. From
the start, our social science colleagues had warned that,
except in time of actual emergency, no public issue is
really salient in popular thought. Nevertheless we were
sanguine: the federal income tax was one law with which
virtually everyone had direct contact, high surtax rates
had been a prominent feature of the law for almost a
generation, and, if there was any vitality at all to the
notion of a community sense of justice as a foundation
for law/ it should appear in considering the blunt issue
of how the tax burden in fairness ought to be allocated
among individuals.
Pilot operations indicated that our expectations were
clearly in error. Tax questions generally were of little
interest to the public, and among tax questions the issue
of distributing the tax burden ranked near the bottom.
Even when we had reconciled ourselves to the absence of
any conscious opinion and had turned to search for
"latent sentiments," our efforts were almost completely
frustrated. The precise difficulties are worth emphasizing
here. Except for a relatively small elite, the very notion of
a progressive tax proved to be beyond grasp. By and large
people could understand the concept of the wealthy pay­
ing more in tax than the less wealthy, but they did not
comprehend the idea of the wealthy paying more than a
proportionately greater tax than the less wealthy. Pro­
portionate and progressive rate schedules simply were
not seen as involving a choice of principles. This same
mathematical barrier probably accounted for another
difficulty. It is our impression that most people were
interested only in the level of their own taxes and not in
the ratio of that level to the tax burden on others with
different incomes.
In probing as deeply as we could for the reason why
the few who did understand the progression principle
thought the rich should pay more, we were unable to
find anything other than simple, unanalyzed ability-to­
pay notions. There was virtually no associating taxes
with economic incentives or purchasing power-or with
envy or hostility to the rich or with concern over eco­
nomic inequality.
There was one other clue from the study that seemed
rich in political implications. People, it appeared, would
distribute a tax increase differently than a tax reduction.
They thought it most fair to handle an increase by put­
ting relatively larger burdens on the rich, but, in the case
of a reduction, they thought it most fair to give relatively
more of the benefit to the less wealthy rather than return
to the tax distribution that had prevailed before the in­
crease. In any change in total taxes, either up or down,
the popular view of fairness would tend to make the rate
structure more progressive.
The Uneasy Case was an effort to explore what might
be called the intellectual case for progression. In making
the empirical tax study, our aim was to lay the results of
a public opinion survey alongside the original essay. To
the faintest degree, an interesting contrast emerged from
the pilot work: the public, unlike a few intellectuals, vir­
tually never thinks of the progressive tax as an instru­
ment for reducing economic inequality. But more basic
is the fact that the progression issue is so far beyond the
reach of public opinion that it is futile and misleading to
talk here of comparing expert opinion and public
opmlOn.
This massive absence of any public opinion, except
among the elite, adds a new puzzle to the political his­
tory of progression. In the essay we had noted that the
intellectual arguments in support of progression all came
well after progression had become a political fact," It
could be inferred that the intellectuals were following
the public rather than leading it and were seeking to find
a rational basis for a strong but unarticulated popular
sentiment." The sources of the political development,
which ten years ago we found to be obscure, now seem
to be more mysterious than ever. It is hard to believe that
the tiny public sentiment which we were able to unearth
could ever have been strong enough to produce the polit­
ical fact of progression.
2
One of the most notable recent developments on the
world scene has been the emergence of the new nations.
As the leaders of these countries have turned to the older
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states for counsel, the economic problems of underde­
veloped countries have become widely discussed. High
among these problems has been tax policy. The literature
on tax policy for underdeveloped countries provides a
second novel vantage point for reflecting again on pro­
gressive taxation.
Observers generally agree that there are a number of
characteristics common to most of the underdeveloped
countries.
First, there is an extremely wide discrepancy in wealth and
income between a relatively small high income group and a
majority of the population whose income borders on subsistence.
Second, the high income group is the focus, or more accurately
the essence, of whatever political or economic stability exists. This
group, tracing its wealth and position to large landholdings,
tends to dominate the social, political, and economic structures of
the nation. Finally, there is an ardent desire to be considered a
modern progressive nation with political autonomy."
Under these conditions, the development of tax policy is
caught in a sharp cross fire. On the one side there is a
strong need to pre6erve economic incentives and not to
alienate the economic elite who are a key source of stabil­
ity. On the other side there is a strong desire to utilize
sharply progressive taxes.
Two sources of this momentum toward progression
are of special interest. There is the wish to emulate what
is considered to be the moral style of advanced countries,
and a distinctly progressive tax structure is viewed as a
mark of a civilized country. As one observer has put it:
"Progressive income taxation is desired simply because it
is regarded as one of the symbols of modern govern­
rnent.?" There is, as another source, an emphasis the
bluntness of which may be startling to. those conditioned
to the tradition of American political discussion. Official
statements of policy in underdeveloped countries are ex­
plicitly phrased in terms of redistributing wealth or in­
come. It is made clear that the attraction of progression
for these countries is that it will mitigate economic in­
equalities. An Indian Commission reporting on tax poli­
cy a few years back listed as the first main criterion of a
tax system: ". . . the incidence of a tax system and its
suitability for reducing inequality of income and wealth,
viz., the distribution of the burden of taxation and its
redistributive effects and possibilities."? The commission
went on to observe:
We can no longer afford to leave the problem of equality to the
automatic functioning of economic and social forces.... The
demand that the instrument of taxation should be used as a
means of bringing about a redistribution of income, more in con­
sonance with social justice, cannot be kept in abeyance."
But these spokesmen are equally explicit in recogniz­
ing the conflict between objectives. Nowhere are the ten­
sions between the equalitarian aspirations and the disin­
centive effects of progression seen more vividly. The
variety of responses to this conflict could almost have
been predicted. At one extreme is the view that progres­
sion is compatible only with a mature economy; in the
words of one observer, "extensive reliance on income
taxes or other ability to pay measures is a social and eco­
nomic luxury which the lesser developed nations of the
world cannot yet afford."9 The advice which follows is
to separate the political and economic objectives by offer­
ing little more than lip service to progression so as to
satisfy the required political rhetoric. At the opposite
pole is the conclusion of a United Nations Technical
Assistance Report: "Redistributive finance appears to
offer greater gains and involve less cost to underde­
veloped than to developed economies.l"? This view pro­
ceeds not only from a willingness to have the govern­
ment perform the main role in capital formation but also
from the premise that, given the structure of underde­
veloped economies, the major disincentives will fall on
rentiers rather than on entrepreneurs. In between these
extremes is the hopeful position voiced by the Indian
Commission: "Ways and means, therefore, must be de­
vised to insure simultaneous progress in both directions,
viz., of greater production and of better distribution."!'
The expectation apparently is that it will be possible to
build into a progressive tax structure a set of exceptions
and qualifications which will maintain the necessary in­
centives for specific economic functions without destroy­
ing its redistributive potentialP
Thus, although the relevant conditions in underde­
veloped countries would seem to be dramatically differ­
ent from circumstances in the United States, the progres­
sion issue, when transplanted, is no less uneasy. But the
grossness of the inequalities of wealth and income and
the depth of poverty in those countries cause a marked
difference in the prevailing rheroric+"
3
Ten years ago we were puzzled as to why Henry
Simons' bluntness had not had more impact on the tone
of discussions in the United States. Writing in the late
thirties, he exasperatedly asserted that the whole super­
structure of sacrifice and ability-to-pay theorizing was
simply nonsense and that the case for progression was no
more and no less than the case for mitigating "unlovely"
economic inequality." One then would have thought
that the cat had been let out of the bag forever and
would have predicted that discussion of progression
would never be the same after this outburst of candor.
On reviewing the recent literature on the redistributive
aspects of progression, we note some interesting changes
in emphasis, but on the whole the approach to redistri­
bution by those favoring progressiorr'" is still curious.
The most obvious change is the diminished appetite for
justifying progression on the basis of sacrifice analysis
and its many subtleties." What is particularly note­
worthy is that in virtually surrendering sacrifice analysis,
Vol. 12, No.2 The University of Chicago Law School 31
with its postulate of declining marginal utility of money,
the defenders of progression have not followed the path
of Simons. Instead, they are willing to acknowledge re­
distribution as relevant but are unwilling to rest the case
for progression on it. Typical of such contemporary com­
mentators is Roy BloughP After saying that sacrifice,
faculty, and even benefit theories "point to progression,
but only in a rather moderate degree," he argues that the
current tax rate "involve also at least a degree of skepti­
cism that the distribution of income is demonstrably the
best one." And having so modestly indorsed the equali­
tarian rationale for progression, he adds the further
qualification that the "attitude that has chiefly been in­
volved" is not that of "deliberately using tax and ex­
penditure measures to reduce the incomes of people be­
cause these are deemed to be too high" but rather that of
"looking around for the best place to impose taxes that
have to be levied on someone."
Another recent commentator, Louis Eisenstein, is like­
wise chary in dealing with progression and economic
equality.l" He moves rapidly through three positions.
Initially, he sees as a special weakness of sacrifice or
ability-to-pay theories that their claim to neutrality is an
illusion since in fact taxes have effects on the distribution
of wealth and income. Accordingly, he finds inescapable
the proposition of Simons that "it is only sensible to face
the question as to what kinds of effects are desirable.l''"
A few pages later, however, he tells us that "though we
still have progression, it is no longer prudent to say in so
many words that the primary purpose of the graduated
rates is to diminish the economic differences that charac­
terize our economy.Y" Next, he asserts that whether
prudent or not there would be no point in confronting
the equality question directly inasmuch as there is no
way of answering the question, "If the rates are to miti­
gate inequalities of wealth, how drastic should they be
in pursuit of this objective? "21 And he adds, "Everyone
who meditates on such problems will respond in the
light of his own views on equality."22
A different resolution of the equality issue is put for­
ward by Harold Groves." In his words, he wishes to
find a position which affords "a detour around the futile
snarls of the classical case" of sacrifice theory and "the
pure value judgments of the Simons-Taussig school." He
rejects sacrifice theory because it does not persuade and
he rejects the equalitarian value judgment because it is
"debate closing." As a solution, following the line of
argument developed by Elmer Fagan,24 he urges placing
the case on the total effects of progression. In setting tax
policy, he would have us interested in
what progre�sive tax�tio? will do to serve or disserve such widely
accepted .n�tional obJectlv�s as an increase in per capita real in­
come, �mll1mum economic fluctuations, a workable tax system
pr.oducmg adequate revenue, political stability under represent­
ative government, international independence or security, elimi-
nation of extrerne want, and perhaps mitigation of social dis­
orders, such as crime, divorce, mental illness and the like."
Tax alternatives, in short, should be weighed "not in
terms of the personal but rather the social significance of
income.Y" On this view, the distribution of income be­
comes only one among many factors to be considered in
appraising progression; in Groves's phrase, it is treated
"as an intermediate means rather than an end."27
The positions taken by Blough, Eisenstein, and Groves,
although quite distinct from each other,28 leave a com­
mon impression. The whole issue of redistribution is
muted and is handled with gentility. Even with the
props of sacrifice theory substantially removed, there is
still a strong pull away from resting the case for pro­
gression squarely on doing something about economic
inequalities. This, however, seems not so much due now
to a default in candor. Rather it appears to arise from
two other sources. First, there is a sense of despair over
arguing the case for progression on grounds of a subjec­
tive judgment about what degree of inequality is disturb­
ing in our society. Second, there is a disinclination to
treat economic inequality in contemporary America as a
very serious social problem. Eisenstein has recently put
his finger on the point: "The usual liberal approach
today is that if we can promote economic growth, if we
can have a larger pie, all segments of society will neces­
sarily have larger shares of that pie and we won't have to
worry about redistribution of income anymore.Y" This
strikes us as a shrewd insight into the changing scene,
and one which has been noted by others.f" But while it
may explain why current writing does not re-echo the
intensity of Simons, it more than ever leaves the intel­
lectual case for progression in the obscurantist's vein.
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SUMMER QUARTER PROGRAM
REDRESS OF CERTAIN HARMS. Jo DESHA LUCAS, Pro­
fessor of Law, The University of Chicago Law School.
TRUSTS. EDWARD C. HALBACH, JR., Professor of Law, Uni­
versity of California, Berkeley; Visiting Professor of Law,
The University of Chicago Law School.
MODERN REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS. SHELDON
TEFFT, James Parker Hall Professor of Law, The Univer­
sity of Chicago Law School.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II. PHILIP B. KURLAND, Pro­
fessor of Law, The University of Chicago Law School.
CONFLICT OF LAWS. STANLEY A. KAPLAN, Professor of
Law, The University of Chicago Law School.
SEMINAR ON THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ROB­
INSON-PATMAN ACT CASES. AARON DIRECTOR, Pro­
fessor of Economics, The University of Chicago Law
School.
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AVery Special Gift
Elsewhere in this issue of the Record, it is reported that
the Tenth Annual Law School Fund Campaign achieved
a new record of $101,500. Part of this total came from an
unusual source.
Miss Carol Loeb is an undergraduate student at North­
western University; she is also the daughter of Jack Loeb,
JD'37. One of the significant components of ,the Tenth
Fund Campaign was the special 25th Anniversary Gift
of the Class of 1937.
Miss Loeb, in honor of the 50th Birthday of her father,
made a generous contribution to the Anniversary Gift of
his Class. Her mother, Mrs. Jack W. Loeb joined in this
gift, which inspired other members of Mr. Loeb's class
to participate also.
It has long been true that the School's Annual Fund
Campaigns have had the support of friends of the School
who did not happen to be alumni. The School is espe­
cially appreciative of Miss and Mrs. Loeb's unusual
gesture.
Ad Astra ...
The National Legal Aid and Defender Association has
awarded the Arthur von Briesen Medal for 1963 to Pro­
fessor FRANCIS A. ALLEN, of the University of Chicago
Law School. The award is presented periodically to those
who have provided distinguished leadership in Legal
Aid and Defender Work. It was established in 1961, and
was awarded posthumously to Charles Evans Hughes,
Elihu Root and William Howard Taft. The following
year, the Medal was presented to Orison S. Marden, dis­
tinguished member of the New York Bar and member
of the Law School Visiting Committee. The citation to
Professor Allen read, in part:
Legal historians may place the 1963 Report of the Attorney
General's Committee on Poverty and the Administration of Crimi­
nal Justice next to Justice and the Poor, by Reginald Heber Smith,
Legal Aid in the United States, by the late Emery A. Brownell,
and Equal Justice for the Accused, as a landmark in the develop­
men t of Legal Aid and Defender services for those unable to
employ private lawyers. Francis Allen, Professor of Law at the
University of Chicago, served as chairman of the committee and
is primarily responsible for a persuasive Report which constitutes
a convincing and objective treatise on the right to counsel, present
practices, and the need for adequate defense counsel by indigent
persons accused of crime in the federal courts. The recommenda­
tions in the Report served as the basis for the Criminal Justice Act
of 1963, now pending in the Congress, and constitutes one of the
most important developments in the program for defense of the
indigent in the federal courts in this generation.
SOIA MENTSCHIKOFF, Professor of Law, was a member
of the United States delegation to a conference on inter­
national sales, held at the Hague in early April. Miss
Mentschikoff was also selected to deliver the Addison
Harris Memorial Lecture at Indiana University School
of Law. Her topic was "The Common Law Tradition:
The Uniform Commercial Code."
MAX RHEINSTEIN, Max Pam Professor of Comparative
Law, is spending the early part of the Spring Quarter
as NATO Professor at the University of Brussels; he
will then serve the remainder of the quarter as a mem­
ber of the International Faculty for the Study of Com­
parative Law, at the University of Strasbourg.
Alfred de Grazia, Editor and Publisher of the Ameri­
can Behavioral Scientist, and Charles L. Ruttenberg, a
graduate student in political science at New York Uni­
versity, recently conducted a survey of innovators in the
study of the legal process. In the course of this survey
they polled 120 scholars thought by them to have "either
pioneered in the study of the legal process by using new
methods and outlooks from the social and behavioral
sciences, or developed significant new directions for legal
research by opening up new fields or by promoting im­
portant new concepts." (Quotation from article reporting
their findings, "Innovators in the Study of the Legal
Process," American Behavioral Scientist, Volume 7,
Number 4, December, 1963, page 48.) Each of these
scholars was asked to rate the other 119 on a scale
ranging from 9, signifying a very high opinion of a
man's significance as an innovator, to 1, for a very low
opinion. The result was that Professor HARRY KALVEN,
JR., of the Law School, received the highest rating
awarded.
The Commonwealth Fellows for 1963-64, left to right: Daniel D.
Prentice, LL.B., Queen's University, Belfast; Salomone Picciotto,
B.A., Oxford; and Jacob 1. Fajgenbaum, LL.B., University of
Melbourne.
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Corporation Law
and Securities Regulation
By STANLEY A. KAPLAN
Professor of Law, The University of Chicago Law School
A talk before the Corporation Law Committee of the Chicago Bar
Association, reprinted here from The Business Lawyer, Volume
18, Number 3, April, 1963, with the kind permission at the pub­
lication and the author.
The attention of this committee-and of many corpo­
ration lawyers-in the study or practice of what has been
called "corporation law" has been focused almost exclu­
sively upon state corporation statutes. The field of securi­
ties regulation is still regarded by many lawyers as a
somewhat esoteric specialty concerned with the sale of
new securities issues and regulation of stock exchange
practices. The impact of securities regulation upon corpo­
ration law and practice and the effective taking-over, by
securities regulations, of substantial areas that were pre­
viously considered the private domain of so-called "cor­
poration law" has been too little recognized. A com­
parison of two modern casebooks, Baker & Cary on
Corporations and Jennings and Marsh on Securities Reg­
ulation makes this point nicely. The Corporation case­
book contains a substantial segment of material on proxy
regulations of the Securities �nd Exchange Commiss�onunder the Securities Exchange Act, on the short-swing
profit restrictions of Section 16(b) of the Securities Ex­
change Act and on fiduciary concepts and fraud prohi­
bitions under rule 10b-5 issued pursuant to the Securities
Exchange Act. The potential effect of rule 10b-5 in con­
nection with fiduciary relations in corporate affairs
(where a purchase or sale of securities is involved) and
upon control over the internal affairs of corporations is
indicated by the Commission's statement that "the Se­
curities Acts may be said to have generated a wholly new
and far reaching body of federal corporation law."! The
chairman of the Commission has also stated that "coun­
sel must be aware of the rights and duties created by
this jurisprudence and must appreciate its applicability
to. a two-man corporation as well as to. A.T.&T. In all
probability, this federal influence will expand rather than
conrract.Y
Thus the Corporation Law casebook recognizes the
entry, in substantial significance and weight, of federal
securities regulation into. "corporation law." Correspond­
ingly, in the Securities Regulation casebook, the preface
states that material with respect to Section 16(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 relating to insiders'
1 Cady Roberts and Co., Securities and Exchange Act Release No. 6668,
p. 4. Cf. McClure v. Borne Chemical Co., 292 F. 2d 824, 834 (3d Cir.
1961).
2 Cary, Book Review, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 857, 858-59 (1962).
short-swing profits and with respect to proxy regulations
under the same Act belongs in corporation law for con­
sideration and therefore is not included in the Securities
Regulation casebook. However, materials and cases re­
lated to rule 10b-5 are accorded a major place in the
Securities Regulation casebook, just as they are in the
Corporation Law casebook, thereby recognizing that this
material is equally applicable to both fields. It is neces­
sary for the corporation lawyer to. follow the develD�­
ment of securities regulation insofar as it affects tradi­
tional areas of corporation law and to. regard the rules,
regulations, statutes and the administrative practices in
the field of federal and state securities law as significant
new sources of "corporation law."
In states such as Illinois, Delaware and New York,
and states which have adopted the Model Business Cor­
poration Act, the basic theory of the st�tutes, in eff�ct,
is to set up enabling provisions to permit a corporation
to. act with considerable freedom, to forbid only certain
egregious improprieties and to require only certain speci­
fied shareholder protections, Certain additional protec­
tive devices and arrangements have been imposed by the
courts through fiduciary analogies and their application
to. corporate relationships, The trend in these corpora­
tion statutes and the decisions thereunder has generally
been toward greater corporate flexibility and the reduc­
tion of restrictions and restraints; whether this is good
or bad can be debated, but the existence of this tendency
must be admitted.
The state securities Dr "blue-sky" laws were originally
designed to. prevent sale of securities on the basis of
inadequate or fraudulent information or under terms of
sale which would make their sale inequitable. The lan­
guage of many statutes is broad enough to allow the
administrator of the state blue-sky laws to deny a permit
to sell securities within the state either (a) if the securi­
ties, or their price, is not fair, just and equitable or (b)
if the sale of the securities is inequitable or fraudulent,
or would tend to work a fraud. As blue-sky commission
activity has, with the passage of time, become more
rooted in our economic and legal structure, state com­
missions have begun to. prohibit or restrict the sale of
securities upDn the finding that the sale is fraudulent Dr
tends to work a fraud, if any significant aspect of the
corporation's internal relationships violate the commis­
sion's standards of propriety. FDr example, if option war­
rants are granted to' underwriters or if certain kinds of
options are granted to officers Dr employees of the issuer,
the existence or granting of such options is regarded as
constituting a fraud or tending to create a fraud, even
though there may be full disclosure of such options to­
gether with adequate disclosure of the possible impact
by way of dilution upon exercise. Certain kinds of mal­
distribution of voting rights may be similarly treated.
Thus as the restrictions and restraints under corporation
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statutes tend to be reduced, restrictions and restraints
imposed through the state blue-sky laws are in the
process of expanding.
Some commentators contend that the proper function
of blue-sky laws is to supplement, amplify and repair the
laxness of corporation laws." California has done so, in
effect, and many other state blue-sky securities commis­
sioners are beginning to veer toward the same philos­
ophy, either by avowed action or by indirection.
Primarily through the expansion and application of
rule 10b-5, as indicated by the Cady Roberts '& Co. de­
cision by the Securities and Exchange Commission, and
by such court decisions as the Kardon" case, a new pres­
ence, namely the federal securities laws, has been brought
into the field of corporation law and a whole new set of
standards and restraints have been imposed. Similarly,
the proxy requirements of Section 14 and the short-swing
insider profit rules of Section 16(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 have intervened directly in cor­
porate activities and have created a new set of rules and
requirements.
In addition to witnessing the advent of important new
sources of corporation law, several interesting cross­
currents and divergent movements in the corporate field
are also discernible. At the same time there has been a
reduction of restrictions and restraints in the corporation
statutes, there has been an expansion and extension of
restrictions and restraints in corporate rulings outside the
statutes themselves. This latter expansion is taking place
(1) through the growth of fiduciary concepts,
(i) partly through the S. E. C.'s enforcement of
the acts administered by it,
(ii) partly through court decisions, and
(iii) partly through the adoption of S. E. C. and
trust fiduciary standards by courts, lawyers
and businessmen, through analogy and ex­
ample, even where such S. E. C. or trust fidu­
ciary standards are not mandatorily appli­
cable, and
3 See, Jennings, "The Role of the States in Corporate Regulation and
Investor Protection," 23 Law and Contemporary Problems 193, 'at 207
(1958):
"
... Another method which has not been given the recognition which
it deserves is that of using the state securities acts or 'blue-sky' laws
as instruments of corporate regulation, The chief interest of the state
in these matters is that of protecting its shareholders against unfair
and inequitable share structures loaded in favor of promoters and
managers. The time to check these arrangements is when the corpora­
tion proposes to issue or sell securities. Even a lax corporation statute
may be strengthened by a strong 'blue-sky' law, and a more regulatory
corporation statute can be buttressed by a fair but effective state securi­
ties statute. In this connection, it is important to consider the various
types of blue-sky laws and their strengths and deficiencies as instru­
ments for providing a greater measure of protection for shareholders
against potential management abuses."
ct. Sobiesky, "State Blue Sky Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporations,"
14 Hastings Law Journal 75.
4 Kardon u, National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp, 512 (E. D. Pa. 1946).
(2) through the expansion of actrvities by the state
blue-sky commissioners in limiting offerings with­
in their own states by imposing "corrective" re­
quirements and by prohibiting actions permitted
by the oorporation acts under which the issuers are
organized.
Corporation law is no longer only the law found in the
corporation act to which a corporation is subject and the
decisions thereunder; it must include the rules and regu­
lations of the Securities and Exchange Commission, court
decisions under the acts administered by the S. E. C. and
also the rules and regulations of the state blue-sky com­
missioners of the various financial centers in which a
corporation's securities may now, or later, be presented
for sale.
In the case of the small company whose securities will
never be sold to the public, the "corrective" effect of blue­
sky laws will never be felt; in the case of the small or
medium sized company whose securities will be pre­
sented to the public in a small offering in a limited area,
the extent of such "corrective" effect will depend on the
views and attitudes of the securities commissioners in the
particular area involved; in the case of a nation-wide
offering this "corrective" effect will cumulate all restraints
imposed by any states whose business importance makes
it mandatory that registration or qualification of the
securities issued be effected therein.
Several further observations occur from those just
stated. First, the so-called "corrective" effect of blue-sky
laws in supplementing corporation laws has no effect on
the small, closed corporation whose securities 'will not be
sold to the public; correspondingly it has its greatest
remedial effect upon companies whose securities are go­
ing to be offered widely to the public. This is suggestive
of another trend in corporation law, namely, the trend
toward providing different standards and rules for closed
corporations as contrasted with publicly held corpora­
tions. It could well be argued that such "corrective" con­
trols as the blue-sky laws afford should properly be lim­
ited to companies whose stock is offered to the public but
should not apply to the closed corporation, where the
general public is not involved. Second, this so-called "cor­
rective" effect is infrequent, haphazard and fortuitous,
because it is imposed only when securities offerings are
made, which is very infrequent in almost all companies.
Third, this so-called "corrective" effect is inapplicable
(even with respect to large companies whose securities
are offered to the public) where the corporate action,
which would have been forbidden had it been taken prior
to public sale of the securities, is instead taken subsequent
to the public sale and after the state blue-sky laws are
no longer applicable. An example is a subsequent amend­
ment to the charter to modify a preferred stock right.
(This assumes that the action in question was not planned
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before sale of the securities which would raise a problem
of non-disclosure.) This kind of impropriety or unfair­
ness, after sale of the securities, is controlled by California,
which requires administrative approval of all such ac­
tions, but in other states it is left to the corporation act
itself and to the courts. It would be possible for blue-sky
commissioners in other states to deal with the possibility
of such future unfairness by requiring, as a condition
prerequisite to blue-sky registration, that the corporation
shall commit itself to a series of stipulations as to future
conduct. This of course emphasizes the fact that what is
really being done is to impose a supplemental corpora­
tion act, by administrative fiat. Such action appears to
me to raise the question of avoiding or undermining
customary democratic legislative process. Many blue-sky
commissioners are operating either under vague statutes
which do not clearly give them all of the powers which
they are actually exercising or which do not fix any
meaningful standards for the exercise of such powers as
are granted. Consequently extensive regulatory control is
being exercised over the securities which may be offered
to the public and over corporate practice by officials whose
views cannot, as a practical matter, be reviewed by any
court or appellate agency and who are undertaking to
exercise powers which are either ambiguously granted to
them or in some cases are arguably not conferred upon
them at all. In the exercise of such powers they are in
effect amplifying or expanding state corporation acts, by
rules or by ad hoc determinations which are never con­
sidered by the legislative body which enacted such cor­
poration acts. In many cases, such rulings remain un­
published or are not submitted to public scrutiny so that
the building of a body of general doctrine and the ability
of the Bar to comment upon such doctrine is impeded.
When corporate practice is so controlled and so directed,
by governmental action, it seems appropriate that such
action should be done openly, publicly and in customary
legislative fashion, with public hearings and open con­
sideration.
If it is desired to authorize the supplementing of cor­
poration acts, perhaps it would be best to do so directly,
clearly and intentionally. If it is desired to distinguish
between public and private corporations, perhaps it would
be best to do so consciously and explicitly, in an appro­
priate manner, by official corporation act amendment. If
it is desired to authorize the use of securities acts for the
purpose of promulgating and enforcing regulation which
is ancillary or supplementary to the corporation act, prob­
ably it would be best to discuss such matters in the legis­
lature and, expressly and clearly, to enact provisions for
such practices, after customary public legislative consid­
eration. Although I personally look with a good deal of
sympathy upon the adoption of such a system, I also
personally feel that the integrity of the democratic process
indicates that such a system should be authorized and
adopted in the customary and formal fashion for decision
of such matters, that is, by express legislative enactment
after public scrutiny, hearing and legislative action. I
don't think that such a system-or even a federal law
of corporations-should just grow "like Topsy" or should
develop and ramify from language in a statute which
may not have been intentionally directed to such an end,
though it is agreeably susceptible of such interpretation.
The corporation statutes, which purport to provide for
specific permissible and impermissible structures and
procedures, have a primary and important purpose. In
most instances, securities acts are directed at different
practices and other purposes; where a securities act, such
as the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, is expressly di­
rected at such problems as insider short-swing trading
prohibitions or proxy regulations it is quite explicit, direct
and circumscribed. Unless it is quite clearly the public
legislative decision to commit the promulgation of "cor­
poration" rulings to the hands of a securities agency, state
or federal, then there is much reason to doubt the wisdom
of allowing such action to be taken in all. indirect man­
ner, disconnected from corporation statutes, however
beneficent, wise or desirable the actual rulings may be.
I do not want, by these remarks, to imply any personal
disagreement with the specific results of various securi­
ties rulings by either federal or state agencies. I usually
find myself a strong supporter of such rulings. I do, how­
ever, want to call attention to the fact that the field of
securities regulation is now providing important new
sources of law in the area of traditional corporation law
and also to raise the question of the legal and political
desirability of the present manner of promulgating such
new "corporation" law.
The Honorable Hugo M. Friend, JD'OB, the Honorable Joseph
Burke, presiding, and the Honorable James R. Bryant, JD'20, about
to hear argument in the first of three cases heard in the Kirkland
Courtroom in February.
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The Appellate Court
The previous issue of the Record reported the visit to
the Weymouth Kirkland Courtroom of the Circuit Court
of Cook County, on which occasion the Honorable Jacob
M. Braude, JD'20, presided over a jury trial from the
regular calendar of his Court.
On February 18, Division II of the First District of
the Illinois Appellate Court heard three cases from its
regular calendar in the Kirkland Courtroom. The Court
was composed of the Honorable Joseph Burke.ipresiding,
the Honorable Hugo M. Friend, JD'08, and the Honor­
able James R. Bryant, JD'20. Professor Oaks' article on
the Tutorial Program, page 1 of this issue of the Record,
describes in detail the manner in which these court visits
are related to the School's curriculum.
Justice Burke responds to Dean Neal's words of welcome at a Law
School luncheon for Court and counsel following the Appellate
Court session.
Louis G. Davidson, Esq., of the Illinois Bar, argues before the Illinois Appellate Court at the session of Court held at the Law School in
February. On the Bench, left to right: The Honorable Hugo M. Friend, The Honorable Joseph Burke, presiding, and the Honorable James
R. Bryant, JD'20.
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At the Speaker's Table during the Appreciation Luncheon, [rom
left, Jerome S. Weiss, JD'30, Law Alumni President, University
Provost and former Law School Dean Edward H. Levi, JD'35,
1963-64 Special Gifts Chairman Arnold 1. Shure, JD'29 and 1962-
63 General Chairman Charles W. Boand, JD'33.
The Honorable Arthur J. Murphy, JD'22, Justice of the Illinois
Appellate Court, The Honorable B. Fain Tucker, JD'23, Judge of
the Circuit Court of Cook County, Charles R. Holton, JD'lO, and
the Honorable Thomas L. Kluczynski, Justice of the Illinois Ap­
pellate Court, JD'27, at the reception preceding the Appreciation
Luncheon.
University Provost and Professor of Law Edward H. Levi, JD'35,
apparently assuring Sidney J. Hess, JD'32, William G. Burns,
JD'31, and George E. Hale, JSD'40, that he misses his former life
of peaceful obscurity as Dean of the Law School.
Into Six Figures
The Tenth Annual Law School Fund Campaign, which
was concluded last autumn, resulted in total contribu­
tions of $101,500, the first such campaign to reach the
$100,000 figure. On January 30, 1964, a luncheon was
held in Chicago to express the appreciation of the Alum­
ni Association for the success of that Campaign, and to
discuss the prospects and needs of the future. Specially
honored guests were the alumni judges in metropolitan
Chicago, of whom there are eighteen, and Charles W.
Boand, JD'33 and J. L. Fox, JD'47, Chairman and Co­
Chairman of the Tenth Campaign.
The meeting, presided over by Jerome S. Weiss, JD'30,
President of the Law Alumni Association, heard Dean
Phil C. Neal express his appreciation for the achieve­
ments of the past, outline the principal sources of the
School's current great strength, and discuss some of the
problems, financial and otherwise, which he foresees for
the future. J. Gordon Henry, JD'41, General Chairman
of the Eleventh Annual Campaign, announced the ap­
pointment of Arnold 1. Shure, JD'29, as Special Gifts
Chairman, and discussed the steps necessary for reaching
this year's goal, which is $125,000.
The Honorable Samuel B. Epstein, JD'15, and Leo J. Carlin,
JD'19, at the Appreciation Luncheon.
J. Gordon Henry, JD'41, General Chairman of the Eleventh An­
nual Fund Campaign, contemplates Alumni President Weiss and
Dean Neal contemplating the Campaign's $125,000 goal.
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Seminar in Business and Ethics
During the Winter Quarter, 1964, three seminar meet­
ings were held in the furtherance of the program with
respect to Law, Ethics and Business Practices which is
conducted by the Law School with the assistance of the
New World Foundation. Additional activities in connec­
tion with this program are planned for the Spring Quar­
ter and will be announced in due course.
The seminar meetings during the Winter Quarter be­
gan with a half-hour statement by the leader of the sem­
inar, followed by questioning by student participants, for
periods which ranged from an hour and a half to two
hours and a half. The Winter Quarter meetings were
well attended and the questioning was lively and spir­
ited. The speaker at the first session was Mr. Gustave L.
Levy, a senior partner of the New York investment
banking firm of Goldman, Sachs and Company. Mr.
Levy is a director of numerous corporations, has had
extensive experience in the securities industry, is a mem­
ber of the board of governors of the New York Stock
Exchange and was chairman of the Levy Committee
which played a recent and important role in the reor­
ganization of the American Stock Exchange and which
issued the so-called "Levy report" concerning such re­
organization. Mr. Levy discussed and answered ques­
tions regarding ethical problems in the investment bank­
ing business, particularly with respect to activities of
specialists and to disciplinary proceedings by stock ex­
changes as reflected in the work of his committee. He
also expressed his views on the subject of "self-regulation"
against the background of the recommendations of the
SEC's Special Study of the Securities Markets and the
legislation with respect thereto presently pending in the
Congress of the United States.
The second meeting of the seminar was addressed by
Mr. Milton A. Cohen of Chicago who was director of
the SEC's Special Study of the Securities Markets. Mr.
Cohen was formerly head of the public utilities division
of the Securities and Exchange Commission and has for
more than a decade been a prominent practitioner in the
private practice of law in Chicago. In 1961 he accepted
the directorship of the Special Study and shepherded it
through to its conclusion and to the promulgation of its
widely discussed report. Mr. Cohen discussed the subject
of self-regulation in the securities industry and responded
to questions about many aspects of his report.
The third meeting was led by Mr. Milton V. Freeman
of the firm of Arnold, Fortas & Porter of Washington,
D.C. Mr. Freeman was formerly associate solicitor of the
Securities and Exchange Commission until he joined his
present firm in 1946. Mr. Freeman has had extensive
practice and experience with various governmental agen­
cies and has been involved in significant litigation in the
fields of administrative law and of civil liberties. Mr.
Milton Cohen, right, with Professor Stanley A. Kaplan and stu­
dents, at a reception following his leadership of a seminar in the
Business Ethics series, more fully described elsewhere in this issue
of the Rrcord,
Freeman discussed the subject of "Governmental Public­
ity and Individual Rights," and explored the possible
conflicts between the use of publicity by administrative
agencies with respect to pending or projected proceed­
ings as it impinges upon the desirability of protecting the
individual against injury by improper or improvident
publicity, particularly in situations in which mere public
announcement is in itself an actual punishment. He con­
sidered among other things the possibility of indemnifi­
cation for injury thereby occasioned, qualifications upon
the absolute privilege now granted to governmental offi­
cers from libel actions and the desirability of statutory
restrictions or administrative restraints upon public pro­
nouncements of accusation prior to the conclusion of
hearings.
These discussion seminars have been extremely valu­
able and provocative and have given the student an
opportunity for direct contact with and intensive question­
ing of prominent persons from outside the academic
sphere and in many instances from nonlegal areas. These
speakers have provided expert information and experien­
tial data with respect to problems involving that diffi­
cult area where ethics and law touch, and where stand­
ards of ethics may be elevated by the law or where de­
veloping standards of ethics may be in the process of
creating law.
The program is under the direction of Professor Stan­
ley A. Kaplan, of the Law Faculty.
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Dean Neal opens the Law School's luncheon for current and for­
mer members of the Faculty, and alumni who are law teachers,
held in Los Angeles in December, during the Annual Meeting of
the Association of American Law Schools.
And Now, Louvain
"Honoratus van Waeyenberg, Episcopus Gilbensis, Epis­
copus auxiliarius Mechliniensis-Bruxellensis, Rector Mag­
nificus Universitatis Catholicae in oppido Lovaniensi,
Omnibus praesentes litteras inspecturis salutem. . . . . .
Nos, pro potestate Nobis facta et FacuItate Iuris assenti­
ente, eumdem Eximium Virum Maximilianum RHEIN­
STEIN, Doctorem Iuris honoris causa creavimus et renun­
tiavimus."
For the benefit of any laymen into whose hands this
publication may fall, the words above are taken from the
statement made by the Rector of the University of Lou­
vain, in awarding to Max Rheinstein, Max Pam Profes­
sor of Comparative Law at the University of Chicago
Law School, the honorary degree of Doctor of Law. The
award, made on February 2, 1964, followed .similar recog­
nition from Stockholm and Basle. In presenting Profes­
sor Rheinstein for the degree, Professor Collin, of the
Law Faculty of the University of Louvain, made the fol­
lowing statement:
Professor Max Rheinstein was born in 1899 at Bad Kreuznach
(Germany). In 1924 he obtained a degree of doctor utriusque
juris at the University of Munich where, in the same year, he
was appointed Assistant. During that period he also helped Pro­
fessor Ernst Rabel in the organization of the Kaiser Wilhelm
(now the Max Planck) Institute of Foreign and International
Private Law: in that famous Institute's series, he published his
first important treatise: an exhaustive and outstanding compari­
son between the Anglo-American and the German laws on
Contracts.
In 1931 he was appointed Privat-Dozent at the University of
Berlin. The political circumstances prevailing in Germany be­
fore the war, forced Professor Rheinstein to emigrate to the
United States in 1933 where, thanks to his extensive knowledge
and his remarkable capacity to adapt himself, he became familiar
with the Anglo-American legal system in an incredibly short
period of time. In 1935 he was already appointed Associate Pro­
fessor and thereafter Professor at one of the most famous law
Professor [o Desha Lucas was the featured speaker at the luncheon.
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